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TELEVISED TESTIMONY AND AN EVOLVING
CONCEPT OF CONFRONTATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment right to confrontation guarantees a defend-
ant the right to confront his accuser at trial. This fundamental right is
deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon common law.' Its beginnings date back
to the first century, where the right to confront one's accuser at trial
served as an essential element in reaching the truth.2 Although this
right has been preserved in the Bill of Rights,3 its contours have never
been clearly or explicitly defined by the Supreme Court.4
1. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modem Dress, 8J. PUB. L.
381, 384 (1959). While we do not know how far back in time the concept of a
right to confrontation existed in England, we do know that the right to confron-
tation in English law predated the right to trial by jury. Id. As early as the
twelfth century, the injured party would make an accusation, recite under oath
that he had been injured and would then have to prove his injury by exhibiting
the wound or, if unable to do so, by presenting witnesses who would swear that
he was a man of good reputation whose oath could be believed. Id. at 385.
By the thirteenth century, an accuser was required to present at least two
witnesses before the accused could be put to trial, and the accused had the right
to cross-examine those witnesses. Id. at 385-86. Statutes in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries that allowed the testimony of only one witness to suffice
for conviction of an accused led the courts to increasingly emphasize the charac-
ter of the evidence presented and the character of the witness who presented it.
Id. at 387. One consequence of this practice was the right to confront and cross-
examine that one accusing witness in order to test the witness' credibility. Id.
In the mid-sixteenth century, Parliament extended this common law right to
confrontation to treason accusations; the right to confront accusers, however,
was not extended to other political prisoners until the seventeenth century. Id.
at 388-89.
2. Id. at 384. The rights to confrontation and cross-examination have been
considered important truth-seeking elements since biblical and ancient Roman
times. Id. One biblical example is Festus' report to King Agrippa concerning a
prisoner named Paul: "It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to
die, before that he which is accused have the accusers face to face, and have
license to answer for himself concerning the crime laid against him." Id. (quot-
ing Acts 25:2). Similarly, Pliny, asking what was to be done with the Christians,
was instructed by the Emperor Trajan that the Christians were to be prosecuted
like other offenders, but anonymous accusations were not to be admitted into
evidence against anyone, including the Christians. i
3. The sixth amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. For a discussion of cases involving the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the confrontation clause, see infra notes 23-147 and accompanying text.
(1569)
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In Maryland v. Craig,5 the United States Supreme Court held that the
confrontation clause does not prohibit a state from enacting legislation
to allow the use of a one-way closed circuit television to receive the testi-
mony of a child witness in a child abuse case. 6 This decision contracted
the sixth amendment right to confrontation to narrower limits than
those previously set in precedent. 7 As a result of this decision, a defend-
ant accused of child sexual abuse can now be found guilty and sentenced
to prison without ever having had the opportunity to meet face-to-face
with or talk in person to the child he or she has allegedly abused.
The Craig decision stirred numerous questions concerning the sixth
amendment. What does the confrontation clause mean? Does this
clause ensure the right to literal face-to-face confrontation?8 Alterna-
tively, does the clause bundle together a collection of rights designed to
ensure a fair trial, such as the right to cross-examine and the right to
have the trier of fact observe the demeanor of the witness?9 The ulti-
mate question is whether, in a Craig type of situation, the defendant's
rights have been adequately protected.
This Note will discuss the impact of Craig on a criminal defendant's
rights by reviewing past Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
meaning of the confrontation clause' 0 and comparing this precedent
with the holding in Craig.I' Ultimately, this Note will propose that the
purpose and rationale of the confrontation clause, as historically inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, are served by the Craig holding, and thus
the rights of the accused are adequately protected. 12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Source of the Right to Confrontation
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, which is binding
5. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
6. Id. at 3171. For a discussion of Craig, see infra notes 107-47 and accom-
panying text.
7. Previous Supreme Court cases defining the boundaries of the sixth
amendment were primarily limited to fact situations involving the admission of
out-of-court statements of witnesses who were physically unavailable to testify at
trial. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 23-83 and accompanying
text.
8. This interpretation is espoused by Justice Scalia. See Craig, 110 S. Ct. at
3171 (ScaliaJ., dissenting); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
9. This position is the Craig majority interpretation. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at
3162-66.
10. For a discussion of United States Supreme Court cases addressing the
meaning of the confrontation clause prior to Craig, see infra notes 23-106 and
accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the Craig decision as compared to prior Supreme
Court precedent, see infra notes 148-207 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Craig decision with respect to a defendant's con-
frontation right, see infra notes 107-47 and accompanying text.
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on the states,13 guarantees that a defendant shall enjoy the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." 14 Very little is known about
the early development of the clause, or about the intentions of the Fram-
ers in including the clause in the Bill of Rights.15 Yet, a known fact is
that several states including this right in their state constitutions de-
manded that the right to confrontation be included in the Bill of Rights
as a prerequisite for ratification of the federal Constitution.' 6 As with
13. In Pointer v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that an ac-
cused's sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him is a funda-
mental right essential to a fair trial and is therefore made obligatory on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). For a discus-
sion of Pointer, see infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. James Madison prepared and introduced the amendments included in
the Bill of Rights for the First Congress. F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT TO
THE CoNsTirrTmON OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT 28 (1951). Madison correlated amendments proposed by the states, in-
cluding several proposed amendments concerning criminal procedures, and
introduced them to the House of Representatives. Id. at 28-29. One of these
amendments stated:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial; to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with his accusers and with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
Id. at 30. After passage by the House of Representatives, this amendment was
among those sent to the Senate. Id. at 31. The Senate's consideration of the
amendments lasted for a week. Id Senator Maclay, whose journal serves as the
primary source of information on the Senate proceedings, was ill during this
time period, and thus there is no record of the Senate's reaction. Id. at 31-32.
Available records simply show that the amendments were returned to the House
with several changes and deletions. Id. at 32-33. It was in this form that the
amendments were eventually submitted to, and ratified by, the states. Id.
16. The Constitution of the United States, when completed in 1778, did not
provide for a right to confrontation; it did provide for a federal judiciary, guar-
antee the right to a trial by jury in all criminal cases and contain a provision that
no person should be convicted of treason without the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act. U:S. CoNsr. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
When the Constitution was put before the states for ratification, there were
objections to the lack of procedural safeguards in criminal trials. J. ELLIOT, DE-
BATES OF THE STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE FEDERAL CONSTnTrrION, 124-25
(1836). A Massachusetts representative to the convention objected to the lack of
trial procedures and, in particular, to the lack of provisions for the accused's
right to counsel, the accused's right to meet his accuser face-to-face, the ac-
cused's right to confront witnesses and the accused's right to cross-examination.
Id. Patrick Henry, representative from Virginia, also objected to the lack of safe-
guards, pointing to the procedural safeguards contained in Virginia's Constitu-
tion, such as the accused's right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
and right to call for evidence in his favor. Id. at 134.
These objections were the basis of a compromise. Id. at 124. Virginia, Mas-
sachusetts and several other states agreed to ratify the Constitution with the un-
derstanding that the first Congress would propose a Bill of Rights. Id. at 124-25.
As a result of this compromise, the sixth amendment to the Constitution now
provides that the accused has the right to confront the witnesses against him.
Thus, the sixth amendment is based, at least in part, on criminal defend-
15711991) NOTE
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the other amendments to the Constitution, the confrontation clause has
led to its share of court challenges. Courts considering confrontation
clause issues have encountered particular problems in determining
whether exceptions to the right to confrontation that were recognized in
common law were carried over into the sixth amendment. Common law
exceptions to the right to confrontation considered by the Supreme
Court in past confrontation clause challenges included the use of dying
declarations, 17 transcribed testimony of trial witnesses who died before
retrial, 18 and preliminary hearing testimony from witnesses who were
later unavailable at trial. 19
ants' rights already guaranteed by several states to their citizens. The North
Carolina Declaration of Rights, the first state constitution, provided that a de-
fendant had a right in all criminal proceedings to be informed of the accusation
against him and to confront his accusers. F. HELLER, supra note 15, at 22. The
Pennsylvania and New Jersey Constitutions both provided that criminal defend-
ants should be afforded the privilege to call witnesses and to retain counsel. Id.
The Virginia Bill of Rights contained provisions for the accused to know the
nature of the accusation and to be confronted with his accusers and witnesses.
Id. at 23. The Declaration of Rights of Massachusetts and the Bill of Rights of
New Hampshire both guaranteed the accused the right to know the nature of the
accusation against him and to meet the witnesses against him. Id.
17. In Mattox v. United States, the Court stated that dying declarations,
although rarely made in the defendant's presence and always made outside the
presence of the jury without the opportunity for examination or cross-examina-
tion, have "from time immemorial" been treated as competent testimony. 156
U.S. 237, 243 (1895). Impending death, like an oath, presumedly removes
temptation to lie and enforces strict adherence to the truth. Id. at 244. These
declarations are admitted as an exception to the rules governing the admission
of testimony "simply from the necessities of the case and to prevent a manifest
failure ofjustice." Id.
18. In Mattox, the Court addressed the issue of whether a transcribed copy
of the testimony of a government witness who died after the first trial could be
used at retrial, or whether the sixth amendment right to confrontation prohib-
ited the use of such testimony. Id. at 238-44. The Court held that admission of
the transcribed testimony did not violate the confrontation clause. Id. at 242.
For a discussion of Mattox, see infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
19. In Barber v. Page and Pointer v. Texas, the Court addressed the issue of
whether the use at trial of a transcript of a witness' prior testimony at a prelimi-
nary hearing where the witness had since become unavailable violated the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 720-25 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401-08 (1965). For a fur-
ther discussion of Barber and Pointer, see infra notes 40-44 and 34-39, respec-
tively, and accompanying text.
All of these exceptions also raise hearsay concerns. Pollitt, supra note 1, at
400. In 1973, Professor Irving Young stated:
The Supreme Court has thus far failed to work out a coherent theory of
the relationship between confrontation and hearsay. This is bad judi-
cial craftsmanship, for unilluminated by such a theory, the court de-
cides in the dark, heedless of consistency with the past and implications
for the future .... A coherent theory of the relationship between con-
frontation and hearsay should afford the accused adequate protection
against the possibility of conviction by affidavit or gossip and simulta-
neously preserve whatever logic and flexibility have been achieved over
the centuries of development of the hearsay rule.
4
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B. Supreme Court Precedent
Until recently, Supreme Court decisions on the boundaries of the
confrontation clause fell into two broad classifications: (1) cases dealing
with the admission of out-of-court statements where the witness was not
available to testify at trial; and (2) cases involving restrictions imposed
by law or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination of a testify-
ing witness at trial. 20 Neither category, however, involved the constitu-
tionality of legislatively-created court procedures that are designed to
protect child witnesses from the trauma of face-to-face questioning,
while preserving the accused's right to confrontation. This issue was
not addressed by the United States Supreme Court until Coy v. Iowa 2t
and Maryland v. Craig.22 To place Coy and Craig in proper perspective,
the Supreme Court's previous confrontation clause decisions must first
be reviewed.
Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, I HOFSTMA
L. REV. 32, 41-42 (1973).
20. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (Court, after identify-
ing two categories of confrontation clause cases, held that confrontation clause
guarantees opportunity for effective cross-examination and right to cross-exami-
nation is not necessarily denied by state when witness' lapse of memory impedes
one method of discrediting him). The first category, reflecting the Court's rec-
ognition of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him at trial
as the core of the confrontation clause, includes such cases as Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 73-75 (1980) (where prior testimony of witness was subject to some
form of cross-examination, testimony had sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy
confrontation clause), Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (witness who is
under oath, subject to cross-examination and whose demeanor can be observed
by trier of fact is-reliable informant as to what he or she has seen or heard), and
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970) (where declarant's out-of-court
statements are admitted at trial, purposes of confrontation clause satisfied if de-
clarant testifies as witness at trial, is subject to cross-examination and demeanor
can be observed by trier of fact). In the second category, the Court has acknowl-
edged that confrontation means more than physical confrontation of the wit-
ness, and thus the scope of cross-examination by the accused may not be overly
restricted. This category includes such cases as Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129,
131 (1968) (trial court restrictions on scope of cross-examination may emascu-
late right to cross-examination and raise confrontation clause questions) and Da-
vis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (confrontation is more than being
allowed to confront witness physically).
21. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The Coy Court held that, because the confronta-
tion clause provides the accused the right to confront witnesses at trial face-to-
face, a legislatively-created courtroom procedure allowing placement of a screen
between a child sexual abuse victim and a defendant during the child witness'
testimony violates the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. Id. at
1019-22. For a further discussion of Coy, see infra notes 84-106 and accompany-
ing text.
22. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). The Craig Court held that a state statutory pro-
cedure permitting a judge to receive the testimony of an alleged child abuse
victim by one-way closed circuit television was not a per se violation of the de-
fendant's constitutional right to confrontation. Id. at 21. For a complete discus-
sion of Craig, see infra notes 107-47 and accompanying text.
5
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1. Confrontation Clause Defined
The Supreme Court first addressed the meaning of the right to con-
frontation in Mattox v. United States.23 The Mattox Court considered a
confrontation challenge to the use at retrial of the sworn testimony of
two witnesses who had testified at the defendant's first trial, but who had
died before the defendant's retrial. 24
The Mattox Court, citing federal, 25 state26 and English 27 cases, con-
cluded that overwhelming authority favored admitting at trial the testi-
mony of an absent or deceased witness when the defendant had been
present at the examination of that witness at a preliminary hearing or at
a previous trial.28 The Court held that no hardship was placed on the
defendant by allowing the testimony of the deceased witness to be read
to the jury because the defendant already had the opportunity to exer-
cise his right to cross-examination at the prior trial or hearing.29 The
Court stated that the main objective of the confrontation clause was to
23. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
24. Id. at 240. Mattox had been convicted of murder with the testimony of
two witnesses, Whitman and Thornton, constituting the strongest evidence
against him. Id. Mattox appealed, and his conviction was reversed by the United
States Supreme Court. Id. at 238. The case was then remanded to the district
court for a new trial. Id. At the retrial, the district court admitted into evidence
transcribed copies of the court reporter's notes of Whitman's and Thornton's
prior testimony because both Whitman and Thornton had died prior to the re-
trial. Id. at 240. Mattox claimed that the admission of the transcripts from the
previous trial infringed upon his right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him. Id.
25. The Mattox Court cited an early federal case as an example of an in-
stance where the testimony of a deceased witness was held to be admissible. l
at 242 (citing United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.D. I11. 1851) (No.
15,702)).
26. The Mattox Court cited Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479
(1850), and People v. Oiler, 66 Cal. 101, 4 P. 1066 (1884), as examples of state
cases which held that testimony of deceased and absent witnesses was admissible
and constitutional under state constitutions. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 241.
27. TheMattox Court cited The King v.Joliffe, 100 Eng. Rep. 1022,4 Term
R. 285, 290 (K.B. 1791), The King v. Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 1 Leach
457 (Cr. Cas. 1787), The King v. Smith, 171 Eng. Rep. 622, 2 Starkie 208 (N.P.
1816), and Buckworth's Case (Taylor v. Brown), 83 Eng. Rep. 90, 170 Raym. T.(K.B. 1669), as examples of English cases in which the testimony of a deceased
witness was held admissible in a criminal prosecution. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-
41.
28. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 241.
29. Id. at 244. The Mattox Court, recognizing that this precise question had
not previously arisen before the Court, stated that the defendant's proposition
that the prior testimony of a deceased witness could not be used at a criminal
trial resulted from a misinterpretation of a parliamentary ruling in 1696, which
stated that a material witness' testimony was inadmissible after that witness had
been spirited away. Id. at 240 (citing Case of SirJohn Fenwick, 13 How. St. Tr.
538, 579 (1696)). The Court, stating that the rule in England was clearly the
opposite, distinguished Fenwick as a case where the witness was not deceased and
where there had been no opportunity for cross-examination at a former trial. Id.
6
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prevent ex parte affidavits or depositions from being used against a de-
fendant "in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness." 3 0
Moreover, the Mattox Court noted that the substance of the right to
confrontation is comprised of the right to examine and cross-examine
and the right to compel the witness to stand in front of the jury so that
the jury is able to properly judge the testimony presented.3 1 The Court
stated that a defendant may never be deprived of this substance of the
right.3 2 The Court, however, also specifically noted that the right to
confront a witness at trial may give way to public policy considerations
or the necessities of the case when strict adherence to the letter of the
confrontation clause would provide only an incidental benefit or unnec-
essary protection for the accused.3 3
The Supreme Court expanded the scope and reach of the confron-
tation clause in Pointer v. Texas,34 in considering whether the right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him was a fundamental right
made obligatory on the states by the fourteenth amendment.3 5 The pre-
cise issue before the Court was whether an absent witness' preliminary
hearing testimony could be introduced at trial in lieu of his live testi-
mony, given that the witness had moved out of state and would be un-
equivocally unavailable to testify at trial.3 6 In his defense, Pointer
30. Id. at 242.
31. Id. at 242-43. The Court stated that examination and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses provides not only defendants with an opportunity to test the
recollection and sift the conscience of a witness, but also affords juries the op-
portunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand and judge
whether the witness' testimony is "worthy of belief." Id. at 243.
32. Id. at 244. The Mattox Court would not allow much abrogation of the
right to confront. The Court specifically stated that the substance of the defend-
ant's constitutional protection, the defendant's right to see the witness face-to-
face and to cross-examine the witness, must be preserved. Id. As the defendant
in Mattox had once seen the witness face-to-face and had subjected the witness to
cross-examination, he was not deprived of the substance of his right to confront
the witnesses against him. Id.
33. Id. The Court recognized that the reading of the notes of the testimony
of a witness deprives a defendant of the advantage of the presence of the witness
before the jury, but the Court stated that, however beneficial rules of law are to
the accused, they must "occasionally give way to considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case." Id. The example used by the Court was that a
criminal, having once been convicted of a crime, should not be allowed to go
"scot free" because "death had closed the mouth" of a witness. Id. According
to the Court, there could be nothing more contrary to the right of confrontation
than the admission of dying declarations because they: (I) are rarely made in a
defendant's presence; (2) are made without an opportunity for cross-examina-
tion; and (3) are made without the jury having an opportunity to observe the
witness. Id. The Mattox Court observed, however, that dying declarations have
been treated "from time immemorial" as competent testimony and are admitted
when necessary to "prevent a manifest failure of justice." Id. at 243- 44.
34. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
35. Id. at 401.
36. Id. The defendant (Pointer) and another man had been arrested and
1991] NoTE 1575
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argued that he had not had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the absent witness at the preliminary hearing.37 In response to this ar-
gument, the Court held that, because the right to confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential, fundamental requirement for a fair
trial, depriving a defendant of the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him would be a denial of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of due process of law. 38 At the same time, the Pointer Court, referring to
Mattox, not only recognized the admissibility of dying declarations and
transcribed testimony of deceased witnesses who had testified at a for-
mer trial of the defendant, but also recognized the possibility of other
analogous situations that would not fall within the scope of the confron-
taken before a state judge for a preliminary hearing on a robbery charge.
Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). The chief wit-
ness for the state at the hearing was the person allegedly robbed. Id. This wit-
ness gave his version of the alleged robbery and identified Pointer as the man
who had robbed him at gunpoint. Id. Pointer was indicted on the robbery
charge. Id. The witness moved to California some time before Pointer's trial
and the prosecution, after establishing that the witness did not intend to return
to Texas, offered the transcript of the witness' preliminary hearing testimony as
evidence against Pointer. Id. Pointer objected to the introduction of the tran-
script, but his objection was overruled on the ground that he had been afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. Id.
Pointer's conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at
296. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Pointer v. Texas, 379 U.S. 815(1964).
37. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407.
38. Id. at 404-05. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 400-08.
Justices Harlan, Stewart and Goldberg each wrote separate concurring opinions.
Id. at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring), 409-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 410-14(Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court based its holding on the fact that the
right to confrontation appears in the Bill of Rights, reflecting the belief of the
Framers that this right is fundamental and essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution. Id. at 404. The Court compared the sixth amendment's right of
the accused to confront the witnesses against him to the right to assistance of
counsel. Id. at 403. As the right to assistance of counsel was held to be funda-
mental and essential to a fair trial and therefore made obligatory upon the states
by the fourteenth amendment, so was the right of a defendant to confront his
accusers a fundamental right and therefore obligatory on the states by the four-
teenth amendment. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
The Pointer Court expressly stated its view that the right to cross-examina-
tion is included in the right to confrontation and asserted that no one would
deny the value of cross-examination in "exposing falsehood and bringing out
the truth in the trial of a criminal case." Id. at 404. The Court stated that "a
major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a de-
fendant charged with a crime an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against him." Id. at 406-07. According to the Pointer court, past Supreme Court
decisions, as well as decisions from lower courts, have "constantly emphasized
the necessity for cross-examination as a protection for defendants in criminal
cases." Id. at 404. Because the transcript of the witness' statement offered at
Pointer's trial had not been taken at a time or under circumstances where
Pointer had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the introduc-
tion of this transcript at trial would have amounted to the denial of the right to
confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Id.
8
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2. Contours Added to the Meaning of the Clause
Once the Supreme Court had determined that the confrontation
clause was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
the Court had more opportunity to address the purposes and the mean-
ing of the right to confrontation. In Barber v. Page,40 the Supreme Court
clarified the requirements for the witness unavailability exception to the
confrontation clause and reaffirmed its interpretation of the purpose of
the right to confrontation.4 1 The Court held that a witness cannot be
said to be "unavailable" for purposes of an exception to the confronta-
tion requirement unless the prosecution has made a good faith effort to
obtain the presence of the witness at trial. 42 Thus, a witness' prior pre-
39. Id. at 407 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895)).
While recognizing that there would be other analogous situations that might not
fall within the scope of the confrontation clause, the Pointer Court stated that the
case before it was not one of those exceptional situations. Id.
40. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
41. Id. at 721-22. Barber and another man, Woods, were jointly charged
with armed robbery. Barber v. State, 388 P.2d 320, 323 (Okla. Crim. App.
1963). Woods testified at the preliminary hearing, incriminating Barber. Id. at
322. At the time of Barber's trial in Oklahoma, however, Woods was incarcer-
ated in a Texas federal prison. ld. at 324. The prosecution did not attempt to
obtain Woods' presence at Barber's trial, but instead introduced the transcript
of Woods' testimony from the preliminary hearing on the basis that Woods was
out of the state and was therefore unavailable to testify. Id. Barber's objection
to the introduction of the testimony of a key witness by transcript was overruled
by the trial court. Id. Barber was convicted and his conviction was upheld on
appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Id at 323, 327. Barber
then sought federal habeas corpus relief on the basis that the use of the tran-
script of Woods' testimony deprived him of his constitutional right to confronta-
tion. Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265, 266 (E.D. Okla. 1965). Barber's
contention was rejected by the district court. Id. at 268. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, Barber v. Page, 389 U.S. 819 (1967), and reversed. Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. Id. Jus-
tice Harlan wrote a brief concurrence, agreeing that the state's failure to attempt
to obtain the presence of the witness denied the defendant due process. Id. at
726 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25. The Barber Court emphasized that the state
had made no effort to obtain Woods' presence at trial and that the only reason
that Woods did not testify in person was because the state had not attempted to
seek Woods' presence. Id. at 725. The prosecution argued that Barber had
waived his right to confrontation by not cross-examining Woods at the prelimi-
nary hearing. Id. The Court rejected this argument, stating that failure to cross-
examine under these circumstances is in no way an "intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The Court, citing Mattox as an example, did acknowl-
edge that traditionally an exception to the right to confrontation existed where a
witness was unavailable at trial but had previously testified at a judicial proceed-
ing against that defendant and had been subject to cross-examination by that
defendant. Id. at 721-22 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43). The Court stated
that this exception was justified by the necessity of the case and by the fact that
previous cross-examination of the witness provided substantial compliance with
1991) NOTE 1577
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liminary hearing testimony could not be introduced at trial in lieu of the
witness' live testimony unless the prosecution could establish that it had
made a substantial attempt to obtain the witness' presence, but failed. 43
In addition, the Court reaffirmed its conviction that the right to confron-
tation is a trial right that "includes both the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness." 4 4
Two years later, in California v. Green,45 the Supreme Court once
again reiterated the importance of the right to cross-examination and
the jury's observance of the demeanor of the witness. The Green Court
emphasized the literal right to confront a witness at the time of trial as
the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. Id. at 722. According to
the Court, although courts and commentators had assumed that the mere ab-
sence of a witness was grounds for dispensing with the confrontation require-
ment, that was no longer the case for imprisoned witnesses. Id. at 723. Not only
did federal courts have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad tsti/icandum
at the request of state prosecutorial authorities, but it was also the policy of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to permit federal prisoners to testify in state
criminal proceedings in response to writs of habeas corpus ad tstificandum that
were issued by state courts. Id. at 724. More was required, therefore, to dis-
pense with the confrontation clause than the mere allegation that a witness was
unavailable due to incarceration. Id. at 724-25.
43. Id
44. Id. at 725. The Court theorized that, even if Barber's counsel had
cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing, the result would have been
the same because the right to confrontation is basically a trial right and a prelim-
inary hearing, due to its limited function, usually searches less into the merits of
a case than does a trial. Id. In Barber, however, as it had done before in Pointer,
the Court left open the possibility that the confrontation clause might be satis-
fied by less than confrontation at trial if a witness was shown to be actually un-
available. Id. at 725-26. For a discussion of Pointer, see supra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text.
45. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Green's conviction for selling marijuana to a mi-
nor was based on two prior inconsistent statements made by the minor--one to
a police officer and one at Green's preliminary hearing. People v. Green, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 100, 100-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). The California District Court of Appeals
reversed Green's conviction, holding that the use of the minor's prior state-
ments to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein denied Green his right to
confrontation. Id. at 102. The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
the provision of the California Evidence Code allowing the substantive use of a
witness' prior inconsistent statements was unconstitutional even though the
prior statements were subject to cross-examination at a prior hearing. People v.
Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 665, 451 P.2d 422, 429, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782, 789 (1969).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. California v. Green, 396 U.S. 1001(1970). Upon consideration of the case, the majority held that Green's right to
confrontation was not violated by the admission of the out-of-court statements
because the declarant testified as a witness at trial, was under oath, was subject
to full cross-examination, and his demeanor was observed by the trier of fact. Id.
at 160-61, 164. Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Green, 399 U.S. at
150-170. ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Harlan each wrote concurrences. Id.
at 171-72 (Burger, J., concurring), 172-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). A dissent
was filed by Justice Brennan. Id. at 189-203 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Neither
Justice Marshall norJustice Blackmun took part in the decision. Id. at 170.
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the core value furthered by the confrontation clause.4 6 The Court did
not find, however, that the confrontation clause necessarily excluded the
prior out-of-court testimony of a witness, but rather found that the ex-
clusion of such testimony would be a matter of evidence under the hear-
say rules.47 According to the Court, although hearsay rules and the
confrontation clause are designed to protect similar values, the overlap
in values protected by each is not complete. 48 The Court concluded
that if out-of-court statements could be admitted under a hearsay excep-
tion, then the possibility of a violation of the defendant's right to con-
frontation must be considered. 4 9 The Green Court outlined its view of
46. Green, 399 U.S. at 157. The Court, referring to Mattox, stated that his-
torically there was good reason for concluding that the admission of a declar-
ant's out-of-court statements did not violate the confrontation clause as long as
the declarant testified at trial and was subject to full cross-examination. Id. at
158 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 252-53 (1895)).
47. Id. at 153-54. The Court acknowledged two competing positions re-
garding the introduction of a witness' prior statements at trial. Id at 154. The
Court noted that most jurisdictions adhered to the orthodox view that out-of-
court statements were inadmissable because they may not have been made
under oath, the declarant may not have been subjected to cross-examination
when he made the statement and the jury did not have an opportunity to ob-
serve the declarant's demeanor at the time the statement was made. Id. The
statement, therefore, could not be used to prove the truth of the matters as-
serted therein, but could be used to impeach the credibility of the witness. Id.
The minority view, supported by commentators such as Wigmore, would allow
the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements because the usual dangers of
hearsay are non-existent if the witness testifies at trial. Id. at 154-55 (citing 3 J.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940) (purpose of hearsay rule
satisfied because witness is present and subject to cross-examination and there is
opportunity to test witness on his former statement)). The Green court saw the
issue before it, not as deciding which of these two positions was more sound as a
matter of law, but rather as whether Green's constitutional right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him was "necessarily inconsistent with a
State's decision to change its hearsay rules to reflect the minority view described
above." Id. at 155.
48. Id. The Green Court cited Barber and Pointer as examples of cases in
which the Court had found violations of the right to confrontation, even though
out-of-court statements had been admitted under recognized hearsay excep-
tions. Id. at 155-56 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); United States v.
Pointer, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)). The Court also stated that the converse was
true-evidence admitted in violation of a hearsay rule did not necessarily violate
the confrontation clause. Id. at 156. The Court, however, recognized that there
was some similarity in the values protected by the hearsay rules and the right to
confrontation, and therefore expressed concern for the protection of a defend-
ant's constitutional rights when a state's hearsay rule is modified to create a new
exception for the admission of evidence against a defendant. Id. In Green, the
Court was specifically concerned about the impact on the defendant's right to
confrontation caused by the change in the California Evidence Code permitting
the substantive use at trial of prior inconsistent statements of a witness. Ide at
154-55. For a further discussion of Green, see Thompson, The Use of Modern Tech-
nology to Present Evidence in Child Sex Abuse Prosecutions: A Sixth Amendment Analysis
and Perspective, 18 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1986).
49. Green, 399 U.S. at 161-62. The Court stated that no Supreme Court
decision interpreting the confrontation clause required the exclusion of out-of-
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the purposes of confrontation as: (1) requiring the witness to give his
statement under oath to impress upon him the seriousness of the matter
at hand; (2) forcing the witness to submit to cross-examination to dis-
cover the truth; and (3) permitting the jury to observe the demeanor of
the witness to aid the jury in assessing credibility.50 The Court then
stated that if the witness had died or had become otherwise unavailable
for trial, the opportunity for cross-examination at a prior preliminary
hearing afforded substantial compliance with the purposes behind the
confrontation clause-as long as the witness' inability to give live testi-
mony was not the fault of the prosecution. 51
After Green, the Court continued to grapple with a practical concern
for accuracy in the truth-determining process in criminal trials present-
ing confrontation clause issues. For example, in Dutton v. Evans,52 hear-
say statements were admitted to corroborate the in-court testimony of
an alleged accomplice of the defendant.5 3 Evans, the defendant, was
convicted of murder at a trial in which a witness, Shaw, testified to cor-
roborate a statement purportedly made by one of Evans' alleged accom-
plices. 54 Shaw testified that Williams, another alleged accomplice, had
told him, in effect, that Evans was responsible for Williams being in
jail.55 Shaw's testimony was admitted under a Georgia statute which al-
lowed into evidence a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement made dur-
ing the concealment phase of the conspiracy.56 Evans claimed that the
Georgia hearsay exception was unconstitutional because it differed from
court statements of a witness who was available and who testified at trial. Id. at
161. Past cases had involved situations in which statements were admitted when
the declarant was not available at trial and could not be cross-examined. Id.
Those situations arose because of exceptions to the hearsay rule that permitted
the introduction of out-of-court statements, despite the unavailability of the de-
clarant, on the theory that the evidence was reliable and was incapable of being
admitted in a way that would secure confrontation with the declarant. Id. at 161-
62. The Green court emphasized that these exceptions, which dispensed with the
literal right to confrontation and the right to cross-examination, were subjected
to careful scrutiny by the Court. Id. at 162.
50. Id. at 158. The Court characterized cross-examination as the "greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. (citing 5J. WIGMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)).
51. Id. at 166. The Court further stated that the confrontation clause could
not be construed to bar admission of the witness' prior statements if the witness
could be cross-examined at trial. Id. If the witness had died before trial, intro-
duction of his testimony from the preliminary hearing would not have violated
Green's right to confrontation, and nothing in the Court's prior decisions indi-
cated that a different result would follow where the prosecution produces and
swears in the witness at trial. Id.
52. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
53. Id. at 77-78.
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id. There were many other prosecution witnesses, including an eyewit-
ness who testified that Evans had participated in the crime. Id. at 74.
56. Id. at 78. The Georgia statute at issue provided: "After the fact of con-
spiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during
1580 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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the federal rules of evidence hearsay exception for conspiracy trials.5 7
The federal hearsay exception applies only if the out-of-court statement
was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, while
the Georgia hearsay exception applies to the concealment phase of the
conspiracy as well. 58 The Evans Court stated that an extension of a
hearsay exception by a state statute to include out-of-court statements
made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy did not necessar-
ily violate the confrontation clause simply because the federal hearsay
exception did not extend as far.5 9
In addressing the confrontation issue, the Court again recognized
that the right to confrontation is not identical to the hearsay rules and
focused on whether the trier of fact in this case had a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth.60 In doing so, the Court employed various "in-
dicia of reliability"-factors that would determine whether a statement
could be placed before a jury in the absence of confrontation with the
declarant-in its inquiry.6 1 These factors include the circumstances sur-
rounding the statement of the declarant, the declarant's motivation to
make the statement, the declarant's ability to accurately recall the events
of which he or she spoke, and corroboration of the declarant's personal
the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE
ANN. § 38-306 (1954).
Evans was convicted of murder and his conviction was affirmed by the Geor-
gia Supreme Court. Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240 (1966). The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Evans v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 953
(1966). After exhausting his state court appeals, Evans brought a petition for
habeas corpus relief, alleging that he had been denied his constitutional right to
confrontation at trial. Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968). The
district court denied the relief sought, but the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded. Id at 798-99. After a second denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the
district court, and a reversal and remand by the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. Dutton v. Evans, 393 U.S. 1076 (1969). After con-
sidering the case, Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Burger andJustices White and Blackmun. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
76-90 (1970). Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion, joined by ChiefJus-
tice Burger. Id. at 90-93 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Harlan filed an
opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 93-100 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and
Brennan. Id. at 100-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Evans, 400 U.S. at 74.
58. Id at 81 (citing Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953); Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949)). For the relevant text of the Geor-
gia statute, see supra note 56.
59. Evans, 400 U.S. at 81.
60. Id. at 89. Although the hearsay rules and the confrontation clause stem
from the same root, the Supreme Court had never, and did not in Evans, equate
the two. Id at 86.
61. Id at 88-89. The Court cited Green as precedent for the statement that
the mission of the confrontation clause was "to advance a practical concern for
the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials." Id. at 89 (citing
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970)).
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knowledge on the subject of the statement. 62
The Court stated that Evans was not deprived of the right to con-
frontation on the issue of whether Williams actually made the statement
related by Shaw in his in-court testimony-a witness who is under oath,
who is subject to cross-examination and whose demeanor can be ob-
served by the trier of fact is a reliable witness as to what he or she has
heard as well as to what he or she has seen.63 Rather, the confrontation
issue arose because the jury was invited to infer that Williams, in blam-
ing Evans for his predicament, had implicitly identified Evans as the
murderer.6 With this in mind, the Court nevertheless concluded that
Evans had not been denied his right to confrontation because Williams'
statement did not contain any explicit assertion about past facts and Wil-
liams' knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the
crime had been clearly established.65
In Mancusi v. Stubbs,66 the Supreme Court cited the Barber, Green and
Evans decisions in addressing the issue of whether prior-recorded testi-
mony of a witness could be admitted when the witness had since re-
moved himself to a foreign country. 67 The Stubbs Court noted that the
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. Id. at 88. The Court concluded that there had been no denial of the
right to confrontation because: (1) Evans had exercised his right to confronta-
tion on the question of whether Shaw had heard Williams make the statement to
which Shaw testified; (2) Williams' statement did not contain an assertion about
past facts and therefore the statement carried with it a warning to the jury
against giving this statement undue weight; (3) Williams' personal knowledge of
the identity and role of the participants in the crime was established by other
testimony and by his conviction; (4) there was no more than a remote chance
that Williams' recollection was faulty; (5) the circumstances in which Williams
made this statement to Shaw were such that Evan's involvement in the crime was
not misrepresented; and (6) the possibility that cross-examination of Williams
would show the jury that the statement was unreliable was "wholly unreal." Id.
at 88-89. In addition, the Evans Court evidenced a concern for the danger of a
guilty person going free because of "gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a de-
fendant" which could nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competentjurisdiction. Id. at 89-90 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122
(1931)). The Court also noted that Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses,
including Evans' accomplice, but Evans' counsel had stated at oral argument
that to subpoena the accomplice would not have been in Evans' best interest. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 88.
66. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
67. Id. at 210-13. In 1954, Stubbs was convicted of murder in Tennessee.
I at 207. Nine years later, when Stubbs successfully claimed that he had been
denied the effective assistance of counsel, the State of Tennessee elected to retry
him. Id. at 209. Holm, the prosecution's chief witness in the first trial, had since
moved to Sweden and taken up permanent residence there. Id. Holm had testi-
fied at the first trial that Stubbs had shot him twice in the head and had shot and
killed Mrs. Holm. Id. at 208. The trial judge allowed Holm's testimony from the
earlier trial to be read to the jury and Stubbs was again convicted in 1964. Id. at
209. Stubbs was subsequently convicted of a felony in a New York state court
and sentenced as a second offender under the laws of New York due to his 1964
murder conviction in Tennessee. Id. at 205. Stubbs then sought federal habeas
1582
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focus of the Court's concern in cases involving the confrontation clause
had been to ensure that there were "indicia of reliability which have
been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be
placed before the jury" in the absence of confrontation with the declar-
ant, and "to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the
truth of the prior statement." 68 The Court, after examining the circum-
stances surrounding the unavailability of the witness and the adequacy
of the witness' examination at a previous trial, concluded that there had
been no constitutional error in permitting the use of the prior-recorded
testimony. 69
Until this point, the Supreme Court had relied on cross-examina-
tion at a previous trial or at a preliminary hearing to provide the re-
quired indicia of reliability in cases where a witness was later deemed
corpus relief on the grounds that the Tennessee conviction had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, and
thus the Tennessee conviction could not be used by New York to impose a stiffer
sentence. i The district court denied habeas corpus relief, but the court of
appeals reversed the district court's decision. United States ex rel Stubbs v. Man-
cusi, 442 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
(1) because the prosecution was powerless to compel Holm's presence at
Stubb's retrial, the predicate unavailability was sufficiently shown so that a fed-
eral court hearing a habeas petition was not warranted in upsetting a state
court's determination of the witness' unavailability; and (2) Holm's testimony
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" because it had been given at a felony trial
conducted in a court before a jury, and because Stubb's counsel had been af-
forded the opportunity to cross-examine Holm so as to give the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 212-16. Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in which ChiefJustice Burger andJustices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell joined. Id. at 205-16. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas joined. Id. at 216-
23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 213 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)). For a discussion of Evans
and Green, see supra notes 52-65 and 45-51, respectively, and accompanying text.
69. Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 214-16. The Court held that there had been an ade-
quate opportunity, of which Stubb's counsel had taken full advantage, to cross-
examine Holm at the first trial. Id. at 216. In addition, because Holm had
moved to Sweden after the first trial, the prosecution called Holm's son as a
witness at the second trial to testify that his father now resided in Sweden. Id. at
209. Based on the son's testimony, the trial court found Holm to be unavailable
at the time of the second trial and permitted Holm's prior-recorded testimony to
be read to the jury at the second trial. Id.
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unavailable at trial. 70 A 1980 Supreme Court decision, Ohio v. Roberts71
went a step further. Roberts had a preliminary hearing on charges of
check forgery and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Ber-
nard Isaacs.72 Isaacs' daughter was called as a witness at the hearing by
Robert's appointed counsel and, while she admitted that she had let
Roberts use her apartment for several days, she denied that she had
given the checks and credit cards to Roberts. 73 Robert's counsel did not
ask to have Isaacs' daughter declared a hostile witness or to place her
under cross-examination. 74 When Isaacs' daughter failed to appear at
trial despite the issuance of five separate subpoenas, the state offered
the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal to testi-
mony by Roberts that Isaacs' daughter had given him her parents'
checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he could use
them. 75 The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a violation
of the confrontation clause.76
The Roberts Court held that, while the confrontation clause normally
requires a showing of unavailability and adequate indicia of reliability in
70. See id. (confrontation clause not violated by admission of bona fide un-
available witness' prior-recorded testimony that was subject to opportunity for
cross-examination); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (confronta-
tion clause not violated by admitting declarant's out-of-court statements when
declarant testifies at trial and is subject to full cross-examination); Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968) (confrontation clause not violated by situation
where witness is unavailable to testify at trial and has given testimony that was
subject to cross-examination at prior judicial proceeding against defendant);
United States v. Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895) (because adequate oppor-
tunity for cross-examination existed at first trial, confrontation clause not vio-
lated by reading into record of second trial transcript of witness' testimony from
first trial when witness died before second trial).
71. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
72. Id. at 58.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 59.
76. Id The trial court admitted the transcript into evidence and Roberts
was convicted. Id. at 60. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on
the basis that the state had failed to make a showing of a "good faith effort" to
secure the daughter's attendance; the reversal was affirmed by the Ohio
Supreme Court, although on different grounds. State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St. 2d
191, 199, 378 N.E.2d 492, 497 (1978). The Ohio Supreme Court held that the
state court of appeals erred in concluding that the daughter was not unavailable.
Id. at 194-95, 378 N.E.2d at 495. Nonetheless, because the daughter had not
been cross-examined at the preliminary hearing and was absent at trial, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the introduction of the transcript of her testimony vio-
lated Robert's right to confrontation. Id. at 195-99, 378 N.E.2d at 496-97. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Ohio v. Roberts, 441 U.S. 904
(1979). Upon consideration of the case, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority
opinion, which was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Stewart, White,
Powell and Rehnquist. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58-77 (1980). Justice
Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens. Id.
at 72-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the testimony by cross-examination or by employment of an established
hearsay exception, the reliability of the previous testimony of a declarant
can be inferred in the absence of cross-examination if defense counsel
had the opportunity to test the witness' testimony with the equivalent of
cross-examination. 77 The Roberts Court did point out, however, that the
Supreme Court in the past had emphasized a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial under the confrontation clause and that the right
to cross-examination is a primary interest secured by the clause. 78
The Roberts Court stated that, while the absence of confrontation
may be important enough to call into question the integrity of the fact-
finding process, competing interests may warrant dispensing with con-
frontation at trial.79 Addressing the interconnection of the purposes of
hearsay rules and the confrontation clause, and viewing itself as gradu-
ally building upon past decisions and responding to changing conditions
and competing interests, the Roberts Court laid out a two-pronged test to
restrict the admissibility of out-of-court statements.80 The first prong,
in deference to the constitutional preference for face-to-face confronta-
tion, is a rule of necessity in which the prosecution must demonstrate
the unavailability of the declarant whose statement is to be used against
the defendant.81 The second prong, which comes into operation only
after the witness has been shown to be unavailable, requires that there
be adequate indicia of reliability surrounding the hearsay statement, in
consideration of the confrontation clause's purpose to ensure accuracy
by testing the evidence and in response to the need for certainty in con-
ducting criminal trials.8 2 Therefore, under Roberts, when the prosecu-
tion wishes to introduce statements of a declarant who will not be
77. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 70-73. The Court held that the fact that Mrs.
Isaacs did not know the location of her daughter, and the fact that five subpoe-
nas were served but were ineffective to compel her daughter's presence, were
sufficient for a showing of unavailability. Id. at 76. The Court also held that
Roberts' counsel had the opportunity to question the witness at the preliminary
hearing and such questioning comported with the principal purpose of cross-
examination-to challenge the witness' belief that he was telling the truth, the
witness' perceptions of the matters related and the witness' conveyance of the
meaning intended. Id. at 71. According to the Court the questioning, despite its
characterization, complied with the purposes behind the confrontation clause no
less than formal cross-examination and the questioning was therefore the
equivalent of cross-examination. Id. For a discussion of the purposes behind
the confrontation clause outlined in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970),
see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
78. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57).
79. Id. at 64. The Court gave as examples the "strong interest in effective
law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of
evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Id.
80. Id. at 64-65.
81. Id. at 66.
82. Id. at 65. According to the Roberts Court, the indicia of reliability re-
quirement can be met by virtue of the fact that certain hearsay exceptions are on
such solid foundations that the admission of evidence falling within these excep-
tions comports with the substance and meaning of the right to confrontation. Id.
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present at trial, the confrontation clause will normally require a showing
that the declarant is unavailable and that his statement bears adequate
indicia of reliability.88
The Roberts decision addressed the confrontation clause concerns
for any situation in which a witness is physically unavailable and there-
fore unable to confront the defendant at trial. Roberts, however, did not
address the situation in which a witness is physically available in the
courtroom but unable to meet the defendant face-to-face. This is pre-
cisely the situation the Court faced in Coy v. Iowa.8 4
3. Coy v. Iowa: A Step in the Other Direction
In 1985, the Iowa legislature enacted a statute permitting child wit-
nesses to testify via closed circuit television or from behind a screen.8 5
The issue before the Court in Coy was whether such a screen placed be-
tween a defendant and a child witness at the defendant's trial for sexual
assault against that child witness violated the defendant's right to con-
frontation under the sixth amendment. 8 6
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted that most of the
Court's decisions on the confrontation clause have involved the admissi-
bility of out-of-court statements or restrictions on the scope of cross-
at 66. For a discussion of the Court's definition of "indicia of reliability," see
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
83. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
84. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
85. Id. at 1014-15. The statute read in pertinent part:
The court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or
behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear the
child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child to see or
hear the party. However, if a party is so confined, the court shall take
measures to insure that the party and counsel can confer during the
testimony and shall inform the child that the party can see and hear the
child during testimony.
IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (Supp. 1987).
86. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014. The Iowa statute, in giving the court the author-
ity to place a screen between the defendant and the child witness during the
child's testimony, or to have the child witness testify via closed circuit television,
was intended to protect child abuse victims. Id. Coy was charged with the sex-
ual assault of two 13 year-old girls. Id. At trial, the court granted the State's
motion to have a screen placed between Coy and the two girls during their testi-
mony. Id. The screen blocked the witnesses' view of Coy, but allowed Coy to
see them dimly and to hear them. Id. at 1014-15. The trial court rejected Coy's
argument that this procedure violated his sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion, but did instruct the jury to draw no inference of guilt from the placement of
the screen. Id. at 1015. Coy was convicted and his conviction was affirmed by
the Iowa Supreme Court. State v. Iowa, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986). The
Iowa Supreme Court rejected Coy's confrontation clause argument on the
ground that, because the screen procedure did not impair Coy's ability to cross-
examine the witnesses, there was no confrontation clause violation. Id. at 734-
35-
1586 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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examination.87 Justice Scalia gave a reason for this focus:
[It is not] that these elements are the essence of the Clause's
protection-but rather, quite to the contrary, that there is at
least some room for doubt . . . as to the extent to which the
Clause includes those elements, whereas ... it confers at least
"a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evi-
dence at trial."88
Justice Scalia emphatically stated that the Supreme Court has never
doubted that the confrontation clause guarantees a defendant the right
to confront the witnesses against him face-to-face before the trier of
fact.8 9 According toJustice Scalia, this guarantee of face-to-face contact
between the defendant and the witness fosters a perception and reality
of fairness in the judicial system because of the difficulty in telling a lie
to someone's face.90 From this perception of fairness, Justice Scalia
concluded that the right to face-to-face confrontation serves much the
87. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in
which Justice White joined. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun authored a dissent, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist. Id. at 1025-35
(Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy did not take part in the decision. Id.
at 1022.
88. Id at 1016 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)).
89. Id. The Court, in holding that there has never been any doubt of the
guarantee of a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
fact, cited as authority: (1) a dissenting opinion in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 748-50 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); (2) two turn of the century cases,
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (Court, in dealing with admissibil-
ity of prior convictions of co-defendants to prove element of offense, stated that
fact that can be primarily established only by witness cannot be proved except by
witnesses who confront defendant at trial) and Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 330 (1911) (Court described provision of Philippine Bill of Rights as
substantially same as sixth amendment and interpreted provision to provide ac-
cused with right to be tried, for facts provable by witnesses, only by witnesses
who meet defendant face-to-face at trial); (3) one recent and well-known con-
frontation clause case, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (Court de-
scribed literal right to confront witness at trial as core value furthered by
confrontation clause); and (4) a recent plurality opinion, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (confrontation clause provides criminal defendant with
two types of protection: right to physically face witnesses against him and right
to conduct cross-examination).
Contrary to the Coy Court's view, however, the Green decision did not stand
for the proposition that the confrontation clause guarantees a face-to-face meet-
ing, but rather outlined the three-pronged purpose of the right to confrontation.
See Green, 399 U.S. at 158. In addition, the Coy Court ignored the analysis in
Roberts that suggested an evolution of the meaning of the confrontation clause
through case law and changing conditions. For a discussion of the Roberts analy-
sis, see supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
90. Coy, 487 U.S. at 10 17-19. According to the Court, the historical percep-
tion of fairness in the right to confrontation lies in the belief that it is more
difficult to tell a lie to someone's face than behind their back. Id. at 1019. While
the confrontation clause cannot force a witness to look directly at the defendant,
a jury can draw its own conclusions about a witness who looks away. Id.
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same purpose as a less explicit component of the confrontation clause-
the right to cross-examination-as both ensure integrity in the factfind-
ing process. 91
The Court then addressed the question of whether Coy's right to
confrontation had been violated, and concluded that a screen designed
to enable witnesses to avoid viewing'the accused as they gave their testi-
mony was an "obvious [and] damaging violation" of the accused's right
to face-to-face confrontation. 92 Justice Scalia did recognize that the
rights conferred by confrontation are not absolute and may give way to
other important interests; however, he drew a distinction between the
rights conferred by the confrontation clause that are seen as implicit (i.e.
right to cross-examination, right to face-to-face confrontation other than
at trial and right to exclude out-of-court statements) and the right to
face-to-face confrontation at trial, which is narrowly and explicitly set
forth in the clause.9s While stating that the implicit rights are clearly
subject to exception and may give way to other important interests, Jus-
tice Scalia merely alluded to the possibility and left open the question of
whether any exceptions would exist to the explicit right to face-to-face
confrontation at trial. 94 Justice Scalia noted that "whatever they [the
exceptions] may be, they would surely be allowed only when necessary
to further an important public policy."9 5
91. Id at 1019-20 (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
According to Justice Scalia, although a face-to-face confrontation with the de-
fendant may upset a truthful rape victim or abused child, that confrontation may
also "confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a
malevolent adult." Id. at 1020. Justice Scalia, however, cited no authority, legal
or scientific, to bolster this statement.
92. Id. at 1019-22. According to the Coy Court, the State suggested that the
necessity of protecting sexual abuse victims outweighed the defendant's con-
frontation interest. Id. at 1020. The Court stated, however, that while the use of
the screen achieved the State's objective of enabling the witness to avoid viewing
the defendant while giving testimony, it was not an interest important enough to
outweigh the "right to a face-to-face encounter." Id.
93. Id. Justice Scalia listed the right to cross-examine, the right to exclude
out-of-court statements and the asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at a
point in the proceedings other than trial as examples of rights that are "reason-
ably implicit" in the confrontation clause but are "not the right narrowly and
explicitly set forth in the Clause"; these rights may therefore may give way to
other important interests. Id.
94. Id. at 1021.
95. Id. Justice O'Connor, in a concurrence joined by Justice White, agreed
that Coy's right to confrontation was violated in this case, but wrote separately
to emphasize her view that confrontation rights are "not absolute," and "may
give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so as to permit the
use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a child witness from the
trauma of courtroom testimony." Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Jus-
tice O'Connor cited the difficulties in detecting and prosecuting child abuse as a
legitimate reason for innovative procedural steps taken by the states to shield
child victims. Id. at 1022-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice
O'Connor, the violation here was the "generalized legislative finding of neces-
sity." Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If, however, "a court makes a
1588 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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The State, in Coy, had maintained that this necessity of furthering an
important public policy was established by the Iowa statute which cre-
ated a "legislatively imposed presumption of trauma" on the child vic-
tim.96 This, according to a majority of the Court, was not enough.
Under the majority's analysis, something more than this generalized
finding of legislatively presumed trauma to the witness would be neces-
sary to establish an exception to the literal right to confront witnesses at
trial.97 Because there was no finding that these particular witnesses
needed special protection, the Court held that Coy's conviction could
not be sustained.98
Justice Blackmun dissented.99 He did not agree that the Iowa pro-
cedure offended the confrontation clause because, in his opinion, the
"preference" for face-to-face confrontation "must occasionally give way
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." 100
He offered the proposition that "[t]he prosecution of these child sex-
abuse cases poses substantial difficulties because of the emotional
trauma frequently suffered by child witnesses who must testify about the
sexual assaults they have suffered."' 0' According to Justice Blackmun,
"the fear and trauma associated with a child's testimony in front of the
defendant" could have other serious results.' 0 2 In addition to
"caus[ing] psychological injury to the child .... it may so overwhelm the
case-specific finding of necessity .... our cases suggest that the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of protecting
child witnesses." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, past
Supreme Court cases indicated that, even for exceptions to the implicit rights
conferred by the confrontation clause, something more than generalized find-
ings are needed. Id. at 1021.
98. Id. The Court thus reversed the judgment of the Iowa Supreme Court
and remanded the case. Id.
99. d. at 1027-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1027, 1031 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, for the
first time in any confrontation clause analysis, introduced scientific studies as
support for a position. He first described the state interest as one of"considera-
ble importance," citing statistics on the number of reported incidents of child
maltreatment and the percentage of those cases involving allegations of child
sexual abuse. Id. at 1031 (BlackmunJ., dissenting). "Between 1976 and 1985,
the number of reported incidents of child maltreatment in the United States rose
from .67 million to over 1.9 million, with an estimated 11.7 percent of those
cases in 1985 involving allegations of sexual abuse." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (citing AMERICAN ASS'N FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFI-
CIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 1985 3, 18 (1987)).
101. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited research indicat-
ing that testimony in court by children could be responsible for "increased be-
havioral disturbance in children." Id. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Goodman et al., The Emotional Effects of Criminal Court Testimony on Child
SexualAssault Victims, in THE CHILD WITNESS: Do THE COURTS ABUSE CHILDREN?,
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY No. 13, 46, 52 (British Psy-
chological Soc'y 1988)).
102. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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child as to prevent the possibility of effective testimony, thereby under-
mining the truth-finding function of the trial itself."' 03
Justice Blackmun also reached an issue not discussed in the majority
opinion-whether the "use of the screening device was 'inherently prej-
udicial.' "104 Justice Blackmun, however, summarily dismissed this pos-
sibility, stating that "[u]nlike clothing the defendant in prison garb, or
having the defendant shackled and gagged, using the screening device
did not 'brand [appellant] . . with an unmistakable mark of guilt.' ,,o
According to Justice Blackmun, without any scientific support however,
a screen was not the sort of thing that would be associated with someone
who is convicted and it was therefore unlikely that "the use of the screen
had a subconscious effect on the jury's attitude toward appellant."'10 6
III. DIScuSSION
It is against this background that Maryland v. Craig10 7 came before
the Supreme Court. The issue before the Craig Court was "whether the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a
child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at
trial, outside the defendant's physical presence, by one-way closed cir-
cuit television."' l08
In 1985, the Maryland General Assembly enacted section 9-102 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (Sec-
tion 9-102).109 Designed to facilitate testimony by child witnesses in
103. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that "some ex-
perts and commentators have concluded that the reliability of the testimony of
child sex-abuse victims actually is enhanced by the use of protective measures."
Id. n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411,
416, 484 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1984); Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without
Testimony in Court by the Victim, 15 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 131 (1981)).
104. Id. at 1034 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1034-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 1035 (Blackmun, J.,.dissenting). In addition, Justice Blackmun
noted that a jury instruction had been given on this topic; he therefore
"doubted] that the jury-which we must assume to have been intelligent and
capable of following instructions-drew an improper inference from the screen
.... " Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
108. Id. at 3160.
109. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989). Section 9-102
provides:
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family
Law Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the
testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown
in the courtroom by means of a closed circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the
courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional dis-
tress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and
the judge may question the child.
1590 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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child abuse cases, the statute authorizes a judge to direct that a child's
testimony be received via one-way closed circuit television. "0 In 1987,
Sandra Ann Craig, owner and operator of a kindergarten and pre-kin-
dergarten school, was convicted of various sexual offenses, assault, bat-
tery and abuse of students enrolled in her school at a trial in which the
allegedly abused children were permitted to testify through closed cir-
cuit television under Section 9-102.111
On appeal, Craig claimed, among other things, that the procedure
authorized by the Maryland statute violated her constitutional right to
confrontation.'1 2 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected
Craig's confrontation clause argument on the basis that the right to face-
to-face confrontation, although fundamental, is not absolute and must
occasionally give way to "considerations of public policy and the neces-
sities of the case." 1 13
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort
to be unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child
when the child testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in
the opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child,
including a person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic
setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge
and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) Thejudge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with
the persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate
electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an
attorney pro se.(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the
defendant in the courtroom at the same time.
Id.
110. As ofJanuary 1, 1989, 41 states had sought to protect child witnesses
through statutory measures. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 553 n.l, 560 A.2d
1120, 1121 n.1 (1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
111. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 257, 544 A.2d 784, 787 (1988), rev'd,
316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
112. Id at 275, 544 A.2d at 796. For the text of the Maryland statute, see
supra note 109.
113. Craig, 76 Md. App. at 282, 544 A.2d at 800 (quoting Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). The court based its decision on an analysis of
two cases. The first of these cases was Wildemuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530
A.2d 275 (1987), in which the Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether
the procedure authorized by § 9-102 contravened a defendant's right to con-
frontation in the context of the requirements laid out in Roberts. The Wildemuth
court found that the statute satisfied the necessity and reliability prongs of Rob-
erts. Id. at 514-25, 530 A.2d at 284-89. The necessity prong was met by a finding
that a child would suffer serious emotional distress in open court; the reliability
prong was met by a finding that the statute preserves most of the aspects of
1991] NOTE 1591
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The Maryland Court of Appeals granted the writ of certiorari and
reversed and remanded the case.1 14 It rejected the argument that the
right to confrontation categorically requires a physical, face-to-face en-
counter between the defendant and witness. 1 5 The court held, how-
ever, that this right can be abridged only when there has been a finding
by the presidingjudge: (1) through an examination of the child witness
in the presence of the defendant, that the child witness is unable as a
result of severe emotional distress to testify in the presence of the ac-
cused; and (2) of the proper procedure to employ so that the right to
confrontation is curtailed to the minimum extent possible.116
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Maryland Court of Appeals and remanded the case,' 17 holding that as
long as the trial court makes a case-specific finding of necessity, the con-
frontation clause does not prohibit a state from using a one-way closed
circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child wit-
confrontation that enhance the reliability of testimony. Id. The second case
considered was Coy v. Iowa, in which the United States Supreme Court held that,
while not absolute, confrontation clause rights would give way only when neces-
sary to further an important public policy. 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988). For a
discussion of Coy, see supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
114. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 (1989), vacated, 110 S. Ct.
3157 (1990). The state supreme court reversed the lower court on the grounds
that the showing made by the state was insufficient to reach the high threshold of
necessity required by Coy before § 9-102 could be invoked. Id. at 554-55, 560
A.2d at 1121. For the text of § 9-102, see supra note 109.
115. Craig, 316 Md. at 562, 560 A.2d at 1125.
116. Id at 566-67, 560 A.2d at 1127-28. The court analyzed Coy and con-
cluded that a general statutory inquiry into a child's inability to testify in court is
too broad to satisfy the necessity requirement. Id. at 564, 560 A.2d at 1126.
Instead, the trial judge must ask whether the child is unavailable to testify in the
presence of the accused. Id.
The court specifically held that, in the face of a confrontation challenge, § 9-
102 cannot be invoked unless the child witness is questioned in the presence of
the defendant and is found by a judge presiding at this procedure to be unable
to reasonably communicate because of serious emotional distress as a result of
the defendant's presence. Id. at 566-67, 560 A.2d at 1127. If a finding of seri-
ous emotional distress is made, measures to protect the child witness must then
be tailored so that the right to confrontation is infringed upon as little as possi-
ble. Id. at 567, 560 A.2d at 1128. According to the court, while § 9-102 is the
limit to which a court can go to protect a child witness, it is not the exclusive
means of protection. Id. For example, if a child would not be traumatized by
the use of a two-way closed circuit television, that technology should be used. Id.
The Maryland court therefore found that, because the testimony was not
sharply focused on the effect of the defendant's presence on the child witness,
the finding of necessity required to invoke § 9-102 procedures and thereby limit
the defendant's right to confrontation was not sufficiently shown. Id.
117. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3171 (1990). Justice O'Connor
authored the majority opinion which was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices Blackmun, White and Kennedy. Id. at 3160-71. Justice Scalia filed a
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ness in a child abuse case'18
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, expounded on her Coy
concurrence by stating that, although the Coy majority had observed that
the confrontation clause guarantees a defendant a face-to-face meeting
with witnesses who appear before the trier of fact, the Supreme Court
had never held that the confrontation clause guarantees criminal de-
fendants an absolute right to a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses
at trial.'1 9 Justice O'Connor noted that Coy expressly left open the
question of whether there were any exceptions to the literal interpreta-
tion of the confrontation clause. 120 In Coy, the Court had held that a
generalized showing of a legislative presumption of trauma to the child
witness was not sufficient to constitute an exception; there must be an
individualized finding that the child witness needed special protec-
tion. 12 1 In Craig, the trial court had made individualized findings that
each of the children testifying needed the special protection provided by
the statute.1 2 2 In fact, the State introduced expert testimony that the
children who would be testifying would suffer serious emotional distress
that would render them unable to reasonably communicate if they were
required to testify in the courtroom.1 23
The Craig Court viewed the central purpose of the confrontation
clause as ensuring the reliability of the evidence "by subjecting it to rig-
orous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier
of fact." 12 4 Justice O'Connor recognized that face-to-face confrontation
118. Id. at 3169. The Court, in this decision, deliberately refrained from
establishing, as a matter of federal constitutional law, evidentiary prerequisites
for the use of a one-way television procedure. Id. at 3171. While the Court felt
that the evidentiary prerequisites established by the Maryland Court of Appeals
(personal observation by the presiding judge of the child witness in the presence
of the defendant and exploration of less restrictive alternatives to the one-way
closed circuit television procedure) would help to present a stronger case for the
use of protective measures, they were not required. Id. Instead, the Court held
that a case-specific finding of necessity, demonstrating that the child witness will
suffer serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communi-
cate, is sufficient. Id. The Court opined that this finding could be supported, for
example, by the testimony of an expert witness. Id.
119. Id at 3162-63. Justice O'Connor stated that the Coy interpretation was
derived from the literal text of the confrontation clause and the Court's under-
standing of the clause's historical roots. Id. at 3162.
120. d. For a discussion of the distinction between the literal and implicit
components of the confrontation clause, see supra note 93 and accompanying
text.
121. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). For a discussion of Coy, see
supra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
122. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163.
123. Id. at 3171.
124. Id at 3163. The Court cited Mattox, Green and Evans for the proposi-
tion that it is the effect of the elements of confrontation (physical presence, oath,
cross-examination and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact) that serves
the purposes of the confrontation clause by ensuring that the evidence
presented at trial is reliable and is subjected to the adversarial testing that is
1991] NOTE 1593
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enhances fact-finding, may reduce the risk that a witness will wrongfully
implicate an innocent person, and serves a strong symbolic purpose by
requiring a witness to testify in the defendant's presence. Nevertheless,
she opined that the right to confrontation is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witness
and the trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the witness'
demeanor. 125
According to the Craig majority, the Supreme Court has never in-
sisted on an actual face-to-face confrontation at trial in all cases in which
testimony is introduced against a defendant.1 26 The Court stated that,
* given the existing hearsay exceptions, the word "confront" in the con-
frontation clause of the sixth amendment cannot mean only face-to-face
confrontation; to hold to such a literal definition would be to prohibit
the admission of any accusatory hearsay statement made by an absent
declarant.' 2 7 Instead, the Court emphasized that there are certain cir-
cumstances in which competing interests may warrant dispensing with
confrontation at trial. 128 The Court held that the right to confrontation
may not be easily dismissed, however, because precedent established
that the strictures of the right to confrontation may be satisfied only
where the denial of face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an
important public policy and the reliability of the evidence is assured. 12 9
Justice O'Connor stated that, while the Maryland procedure did dis-
pense with a literal face-to-face confrontation, it retained all of the other
elements of the confrontation right. 130 Justice O'Connor concluded,
therefore, that the use of a one-way closed circuit television procedure
for the reception of a child witness' testimony encroaches on neither the
fact-finding nor symbolic purposes of the confrontation clause.' 3 '
Once Justice O'Connor found that the procedure did not per se vio-
expected in Anglo-American criminal proceedings. Id. at 3163-64 (citing Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
125. Id. at 3164.
126. Id. The Court indicated that it had repeatedly allowed admission of
certain hearsay statements where necessary, despite the accused's inability to
confront the declarant at trial. Id.
127. Id. at 3165.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 3166.
130. Id. The Court noted that the closed circuit television procedure pro-
vided for the receipt of the testimony of the witness under oath, the opportunity
for contemporaneous cross-examination by the defendant and the opportunity
for the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of the witness (although on a televi-
sion screen). Id. Although, according to the Court, certain subtle effects of face-
to-face confrontation may produce heightened reliability, the presence of the
other elements of confrontation ensures that the testimony received by one-way
closed circuit television is reliable and subject to full testing in an adversary pro-
ceeding. Id.
131. Id. at 3167.
1594 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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late the purposes of the confrontation clause, she next turned to the
"critical inquiry ... [of] whether use of the procedure is necessary to
further an important state interest."13 2 The State contended that it had
a substantial interest in protecting children, allegedly the victims of
child abuse, from the trauma of testifying in the presence of the alleged
abuser.' 33 Noting that it had previously recognized a state's interest in
the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma as a
compelling interest, the Craig majority held that if a state makes an ade-
quate and individualized showing of necessity, the state interest in pro-
tecting victims of child abuse from further trauma is sufficiently
important to justify the use of a trial procedure that allows the child
witness to testify in the absence of a face-to-face confrontation with the
accused.' 3 4 Justice O'Connor buttressed this conclusion by referring to
"the growing body of academic literature documenting the psychologi-
cal trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in court."'135
In addition, the majority opinion again referred to scientific studies in
noting that "where face-to-face confrontation causes significant emo-
tional distress in a child witness, there is evidence that such confronta-
tion would in fact disserve the Confrontation Clause's truth-seeking
goal."' 3 6
The Court cautioned that the finding by the trial court must be
case-specific.' 3 7 The trial court must hear evidence to determine
whether the use of the procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of
the particular child witness and must also find that the trauma to the
child witness would be caused by the defendant and not by the court-
room or a general fear of testifying.13 8 Finally, the trial court must also
132. Id.
133. Id. The Court indicated that the importance of this public policy was
reflected by the number of states that have enacted statutes to protect child wit-
nesses from testifying in the presence of the defendant in child abuse cases. Id
at 3167-68. At the time of Craig, 37 states permitted the use of videotaped testi-
mony, 24 states permitted the use of closed circuit television testimony and eight
states permitted the use of a two-way system which allowed the child witness to
see the courtroom and the defendant and allowed the judge and the jury to see
the child during his or her testimony. Id.
134. Id. at 3167, 3169 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57(1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
135. Id. at 3168 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n
in Support of Neither Party at 7-13, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)
(No. 89-478); G. Goodman, The Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault Victims of
Testifying in Criminal Court, Final Report to the National Institute ofJustice, U.S.
Dep't of Justice (1989)).
136. Id. at 3169 (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n
at 18-24, Craig (No. 89-478), Goodman & Hegelson, Child Sexual Assault: Chil-
dren's Memory and the Law, 40 U. MIAMi L. REV. 181, 203-04 (1985); Note, Vide-
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determine that the trauma that would be suffered by the child is "more
than de minimis."'139
Justice Scalia, authoring the dissent in Craig, felt that the majority
had bowed to public opinion and had categorically failed to protect a
guarantee of the Constitution. 1 40 Justice Scalia, citing his majority opin-
ion in Coy, stated that a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation
means exactly what it says-the right to meet the witnesses face-to-
face. 141 Justice Scalia did not agree with the majority's claim that the
interpretation of the confrontation clause in Craig was consistent with
past cases which have held that other sixth amendment rights must be
interpreted in light of the necessities of trial and the adversary pro-
cess. 142 Instead, Justice Scalia drew a distinction between "the necessi-
ties of trial and the adversary process"-which encompassed the manner
of arranging a face-to-face confrontation, and the case at bar-which
dealt with whether the confrontation took place at all. 143 According to
Justice Scalia, the necessities of a trial and the adversary process may
limit the manner in which sixth amendment rights may be exercised, but
may not limit the scope of the essential sixth amendment guarantee of
the right to confront.' 44
Justice Scalia, mustering scientific evidence of his own, also dis-
agreed with the crux of the majority's test, which required unavailability
only in the sense that the child witness is unable to testify in the defend-
ant's presence.' 45 In discussing the balancing of interests in protecting
child victims from the emotional trauma of testifying against the harms
139. Id. The Court did not specify the minimum showing of emotional dis-
tress required and did not specifically discuss whether the Maryland statute, re-
quiring "serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate," sufficed to meet the standards of the confrontation clause. Id.
140. Id. at 3171 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the pur-
pose of the sixth amendment right to confrontation was to "assure that none of
the many policy interests from time to time pursued by statutory law could over-
come a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 3172 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1016 (1988)).
142. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia admitted that necessities of
trial may limit the manner in which sixth amendment rights may be exercised and
may also limit an expansive view of the scope of sixth amendment guarantees.
Id. at 3173 (Scalia,J., dissenting). He remained adamant, however, that "to con-
front plainly means to encounter face-to-face" and, in that context, the necessi-
ties of trial and the adversary process are irrelevant. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
145. Id at 3174-75 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that unavail-
ability, in the sense of a child's trauma, could not possibly be the relevant sense,
opining that a child's unwillingness to testify in the presence of a defendant
could not be a valid excuse under the confrontation clause. Id. (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). According to justice Scalia, the objective of the clause is "to place the
witness under the sometimes hostile glare of the defendant." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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in admitting a new class of evidence, Justice Scalia noted that "[s]ome
studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable to sugges-
tion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or
suggestion) from reality."' 14 6 While conceding that the majority had
convincingly proved that the Maryland statute not only served a valid
interest, but also gave the defendant virtually everything the confronta-
tion clause guarantees, Justice Scalia found a difference between "virtu-
ally constitutional" and "actually constitutional," and therefore found




In light of the past decisions of the Supreme Court on the purposes
and boundaries of the confrontation clause, Maryland v. Craig adequately
protects the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
The Craig holding fits within the protection deemed to be essential in
each of the Supreme Court cases previously discussed.
A. Mattox and the "Substance of Confrontation"
The holding in Mattox v. United States, 148 the first Supreme Court
case to address the issue of the confrontation clause and witness unavail-
ability, was narrow. 149 If the accused previously had the opportunity to
confront the witness against him, for example in a previous trial or hear-
ing, the confrontation clause would not prohibit the use of the sworn
testimony of that witness at a subsequent trial where the witness was
unavailable due to his death.150 The Mattox Court based its holding on
three factors: (1) there was no hardship placed on the defendant in al-
lowing the witness' prior testimony to be read into evidence at trial be-
cause the defendant had previously had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness under oath; (2) a trier of fact had the opportunity
previously to observe the demeanor of the witness; and (3) the excep-
tion to confrontation at trial was due to the necessities of the case. 1 5
146. Id. at 3175 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Lindsay & Johnson, Reality
Monitoring and Suggestibility: Children's Ability to Discriminate Among Memories From
Different Sources, in CHILDREN'S EYEwrrNESS MEMORY (S. Ceci, M. Toglia & D.
Ross eds. 1987); Feher, The Alleged Molestation Victim, The Rules of Evidence, and the
Constitution: Should Children Really Be Seen and Not Heard?, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 227,
230-33 (1987); Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the
Influence of Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REv. 705, 708-11 (1987)).
147. Id. at 3176 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to justice Scalia, the ma-jority holding guarantees everything except confrontation. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
148. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
149. For a discussion of Mattox, see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying
text.
150. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
151. Id. at 242-44.
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The closed circuit television procedure used in Craig for the receipt of
testimony easily complies with each of these factors. The defendant has
the opportunity to cross-examine the child witness under oath at trial;
the jury has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the child wit-
ness; and the procedure is allowed only in conjunction with a case-spe-
cific finding of necessity by the trial judge. The procedure held to be
constitutional in Craig-ajudicial finding of witness unavailability due to
particularized trauma as a result of being in the same room as the de-
fendant, coupled with the witness' sworn testimony and the opportunity
for cross-examination and observation of the witness-therefore satis-
fies the substance of the right to confrontation emphasized in Mattox.152
B. Pointer and the Equation of Confrontation with Cross-Examination
Pointer v. Texas, 153 while referring separately to the "right of con-
frontation" and the "right of cross-examination," emphasized that the
main purpose of the confrontation rule is to ensure that the accused has
an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. 154 No other
purposes were ever mentioned. The Pointer Court held that a defend-
ant's right to confrontation was violated when a witness' prior state-
ment, which had not been taken under circumstances in which the
defendant had a full or fair opportunity to cross-examine that witness,
was admitted as evidence at trial. 155 The implication from the Pointer
holding is that, where a witness makes a statement and the defendant
had a full opportunity for cross-examination, the defendant has not
been denied the right to confrontation. The closed circuit television
procedure authorized by the Maryland legislature provided for adequate
cross-examination of the child witness. This inescapably leads to the
conclusion that, because this procedure provided the defendant with a
full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the child witness, the defend-
ant was not denied the right to confrontation under the Pointer analysis.
C. Green and the Purposes of Confrontation
In California v. Green,156 the Court outlined the purposes to be
152. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3163.
153. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
154. Id. at 404-07. The Pointer Court noted that the right to cross-examina-
tion is included in the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him.
Id. at 404. The Court discussed the value of cross-examination in bringing out
the truth at trial, referring to Wigmore and state and English cases which, ac-
cording to the Court, consistently emphasized the necessity of cross-examina-
tion at criminal trials. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the Court, citing
Mattox, stated that a major rationale underlying the confrontation clause was to
give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Id.
at 406-07 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44 (1895)). For a
complete discussion of Pointer, see supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
155. Id. at 404-06.
156. 399 U.S. 145 (1970).
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served by the confrontation clause: (1) requiring the witness to give his
or her statement under oath; (2) forcing the witness to submit to cross-
examination; and (3) permitting the jury to observe the demeanor of the
witness. 157 The procedure authorized by the Maryland legislature and
utilized in Craig satisfies each of these purposes. The child witnesses
gave their statements under oath and were subject to full cross-examina-
tion by the defendant's attorney.' 58 Moreover, the jury observed the
demeanor of the child witnesses via closed circuit television.' 59 Thus,
under the Green analysis, there is no diminution of protection by not
having the defendant face-to-face with the child.
D. Roberts, the Unavailability of the Witness and Suficiency of Indicia of
Reliability
In Ohio v. Roberts,160 the Court focused on the unavailability of the
witness and the sufficiency of the indicia of reliability regarding testi-
mony introduced at trial.' 6 1
1. Availability of the Witness
There are two approaches that can be taken to the interpretation of
"availability" of a witness. The first approach regards "availability" as
meaning availability for cross-examination at trial. 162 Craig fully satisfies
the strictures of this approach because the child witnesses were available
for full cross-examination by the defense at trial. 163
The second approach defines "availability" to mean physical availa-
157. Id. at 158. For a complete discussion of Green, see supra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
158. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
159. Id.
160. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
161. Id. at 65. For a discussion of Roberts, see supra notes 71-83 and accom-
panying text.
162. This interpretation, focusing on the benefits of cross-examination, is
supported by the Mattox, Green and Evans decisions. Mattox allowed use of testi-
mony from a prior trial. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
Because the first trial afforded full opportunity for cross-examination of that tes-
timony, a transcript of that testimony can be admitted at a later trial "simply
from the necessities of the case, and to prevent a manifest failure ofjustice." Id.
at 243-44. For a discussion of Mattox, see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying
text. Green upheld a modification of the California evidence laws which permit-
ted admission of a declarant's out-of-court statements provided that the declar-
ant was testifying as a witness at trial and was subject to full cross-examination.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970). For a discussion of Green, see
supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. Evans upheld a state hearsay excep-
tion allowing admission of a hearsay statement made during the concealment
phase of a conspiracy because the witness who heard the statement and who will
testify is subject to full cross-examination at trial. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
88-89 (1970). For a discussion of Evans, see supra notes 52-65 and accompany-
ing text.
163. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
15991991] NOTE
31
Tomlinson: Maryland v. Craig: Televised Testimony and an Evolving Concept of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
bility in the courtroom.164 Under this second approach, the child wit-
nesses in Craig were not available as they were not physically present in
the courtroom. Exceptions to the right to confrontation, however, have
been allowed in situations where the witness is unavailable and when
"necessary to further an important public policy."' 6 5 The Supreme
Court has recognized the safeguard of the physical and psychological
well-being of minor children as a compelling state interest justifying an
exception, 16 6 and these child witnesses could hence be said to be "psy-
chologically unavailable."'167
Is this finding of "psychological unavailability" necessary in sexual
abuse cases for the protection of child witnesses from emotional trauma
and distress? Studies examining the reactions of child witnesses to
courtroom testimony in sexual abuse cases tend to indicate immediate
and lasting harm to the children.' 68 A 1969 study of nearly 200 child
sexual assault cases in New York indicated that the criminal trial process
164. This is the interpretation offered by Justice Scalia in Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988). In fact, Justice Scalia would go even further. In Coy, the wit-
ness was actually in the courtroom, but was shielded from the defendant. Id. at
1015. This, however, was not sufficient in Coy. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, was adamant about the defendant's literal right to confront a witness at
the time of trial. Id. at 1017. For a discussion of Coy, see supra notes 84-106 and
accompanying text.
The Oregon legislature has also taken this view of availability, including the
Oregon closed circuit television testimony provision as an exception to the hear-
say rule. The Oregon statute provides:
Notwithstanding the limits contained in subsection (18a) of this section,
in any proceeding in which a child under 10 years of age at the time of
trial may be called as a witness to testify concerning an act of sexual
conduct performed with or on the child by another, the testimony of
the child taken by contemporaneous examination and cross-examina-
tion in another place under the supervision of the trial judge and com-
municated to the court room by closed circuit television or other
audiovisual means. Testimony will be allowed as provided in this sub-
section only if the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood, es-
tablished by expert testimony, that the child will suffer severe
emotional or psychological harm if required to testify in open court.
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(24) (1989).
165. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.
166. See id. at 1022-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (strictures of confronta-
tion clause may give way to compelling state interest of protecting child wit-
nesses); Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982)
(protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrass-
ment is compelling interest, but not one which can justify mandatory closure of
trial to public).
167. ProfessorJacqueline Parker argues that "if unavailability is the essence
of the sixth amendment right of confrontation, creating a new category of un-
availability (psychological unavailability), for which the legislature finds compel-
ling policy reasons in light of the emotional vulnerability of child witnesses, will
obviously not violate the Confrontation Clause." Parker, The Rights of Child Wit-
nesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 643, 701 (1982).
168. For a discussion of these studies, see infra note 169-74 and accompa-
nying text.
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was stressful for children and their families.16 9 Another research pro-
ject concluded that cross-examination, a core element of the right to
confront, is frequently difficult for child witnesses. 170 In further support
of "psychological unavailability" of child witnesses, a preliminary re-
search study in 1984 showed that child victims may suffer from posttrau-
matic stress disorders and the presence of the defendant in the
courtroom, among other factors, may cause further stress to the already
traumatized child.' 7 1 A later study in the same area "indicate[d] that at
least for a subset of children-those who testified multiple times, who
lacked maternal support, whose cases lacked corroborative evidence,
and who were most frightened of the defendant-testifying is associated
with continued disturbance [of the child witness]."' 172
Not all researchers have come to this conclusion, however. Another
study researched whether sexual abuse investigation and the subsequent
litigation process helped or further victimized children. 173 The conclu-
sion drawn here was that the data did not "support the idea that the
interview and litigation process was necessarily 'harmful' to
children."1
74
Many psychologists believe that face-to-face confrontation of the
child-witness with the defendant is specifically responsible for the higher
level of trauma experienced by some child victims. 17 5 One reason for
this belief is that child witnesses have, in research studies, expressed a
169. V. DEFRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMIT-
TED BY ADULTS (1969) (available through Children's Division, American Hu-
mane Ass'n, Denver, Colo.).
170. Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40
J. Soc. IssuEs 125, 131-35 (1984). A defense attorney's duty is to impeach the
child's testimony, but in this process, the child witness may be intimidated, em-
barrassed or humiliated. Id.
171. Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for Research
and Legal Practice, 40J. Soc. IssuEs 157, 167 (1984).
172. Goodman, Jones, Pyle-Taub, England, Port, Rudy & Prado-Estrada,
Children in Court: The Emotional Effects of Criminal Involvement 8 (paper presented at
97th American Psychological Ass'n Convention, New Orleans, La., Aug. 1989)
[hereinafter Goodman, Children in Court].
173. Tedesco & Schnell, Children's Reactions to Sex Abuse Investigation and Liti-
gation, 11 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 267, 270-71 (1987).
174. Id According to the authors of this study, "[a] greater percentage of
the victims rated the legal process as helpful than rated it harmful." Id A cau-
tionary note was also sounded by these authors, however, in their finding that
"when children were required to testify in court, they more often viewed the
process as harmful." Id
175. Tedesco & Schnell, supra note 173, at 271 (while sexual abuse investi-
gation and litigation process might help child victims more often than not,
"when children were required to testify in court, they more often viewed the
process as harmful"); Goodman, Children in Court, supra note 172, at 6 (one area
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specific fear of a face-to-face meeting with the defendant. 176 This fear
suggests a higher trauma level for the child witness who is forced into
close proximity with the defendant in the courtroom.
Not all victims of child sexual abuse, however, are traumatically af-
fected by a face-to-face meeting with the defendant. One study found
that "the experience of testifying in court can have a therapeutic effect
for the child victim." 1 77 This is why a case-specific finding of necessity
for the one-way closed circuit television procedure is essential. The
American Psychological Association, in its amicus brief in Craig, sug-
gested that there "are factors which may be evaluated on an individual
basis to determine the necessity of protecting a child witness by using
procedures that limit a defendant's right to a literal face-to-face confron-
tation with prosecution witnesses." 178 These factors include whether
the child had maternal support when the abuse was disclosed, the sever-
ity of the abuse and whether there is corroborative evidence of it, the
child's level of fear of the defendant and the age of the child. 179 Along
these lines, however, one researcher has concluded that, while some fac-
tors affecting a child witness' responses, such as maternal support and
corroborating evidence of the abuse, are not directly related to court-
room procedures, a factor which is directly related-the child's fear of
the defendant-appears to have the most significant effect on the child
witness.1 80
In Craig, there was a legislative requirement that the trial judge
make a case-specific finding of necessity before allowing the use of the
Maryland closed circuit television procedure. 18 ' This being the case,
those child witnesses who are found by the trial court to need special
protection could be viewed as psychologically unavailable and their tes-
timony could therefore be tested for adequate indicia of reliability under
the second prong of the Roberts test.
2. Indicia of Reliability
The more difficult issue under the Roberts test is whether testimony
176. See Tedesco & Schnell, supra note 173, at 271; Goodman, Children in
Court, supra note 172, at 6.
177. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 170, at 135 ("some children report
feeling empowered by their participation in the process"); see also Tedesco &
Schnell, supra note 173, at 268, 270 (not all children will perceive courtroom
procedures as harmful). But cf Goodman, Children in Court, supra note 172, at 6
(in this study, "when children emerged from testifying they were generally more
positive about their experiences than they were before they entered the court-
room;" however, "[t]he one area in which they stayed quite negative [] was hav-
ing to face the defendant").
178. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of
Neither Party at 12, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
179. Id. at 11-12.
180. Goodman, Children in Court, supra note 172, at 9.
181. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
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received under the Maryland procedure bears adequate indicia of relia-
bility. According to the Court in Mancusi v. Stubbs,18 2 the presence of
sufficient indicia of reliability determines whether a statement may be
placed before a jury in the absence of confrontation and whether the
trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the state-
ments made by the witness.18 3 The Craig Court, although recognizing
"the many subtle effects face-to-face confrontation may have on an ad-
versarial criminal proceeding," did not address the issue of whether the
fact that a jury sees a witness' testimony on television could change the
reliability of that testimony. 18 4
a. Is televised testimony of a child witness less trustworthy?
One underlying premise of the confrontation clause is that it is
more difficult for a witness to lie when that witness is testifying in the
presence of the defendant.18 5 A traumatized child witness, however,
could very well either refuse or be physically unable to testify in the
presence of the defendant.' 8 6 The courtroom setting or the defendant's
presence in the same room may have a direct impact on a child's ability
to testify accurately.' 8 7 Research has also shown that children more
182. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
183. Id. at 213. Disagreement exists among legal commentators as to
whether testimony via closed circuit television should be treated as hearsay. See
Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REV. 645, 649-59 (1985) (child's
statement via closed circuit television may not meet strict requirements of tradi-
tional hearsay exception and such testimony should be treated as special hearsay
exception); Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 MIAMI L. REV. 19, 47-48 (1985) (testi-
mony of child sexual abuse victim through closed circuit television should be
treated as traditional hearsay for constitutional purposes).
184. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166. The Court stated that "the presence of these
other elements of confrontation-oath, cross-examination, and observation of
the witness' demeanor-adequately ensures that the testimony is both reliable
and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to
that accorded live, in-person testimony." Id. Other courts and commentators,
however, have raised concerns with respect to the reliability of this type of testi-
mony. For a discussion of these concerns, see infra notes 185-201 and accompa-
nying text.
185. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (always more difficult to
lie to a person "to his face" than "behind his back").
186. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n in Support of
Neither Party at 18-19, Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (No. 89-478).
The brief cited People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 255-57, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72-
73, 551 N.E.2d 561, 565-66 (1990), as an example of the behavior of a "dis-
tressed child victim" witness (child reluctant to take stand in defendant's pres-
ence and while child was generally responsive to questions after defendant was
removed from courtroom, her responses were physical and not verbal). Brief
for American Psychological Ass'n at 17 n.39, Craig (No. 89-478).
187. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n at 18-21, Craig (No. 89-478).
The impact of a courtroom setting on children is demonstrated by a 1987 study
at the University of Michigan Law School. Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony:
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often refuse to identify a defendant when he is physically present than
when his picture is used in a photo lineup.' 88 Several studies indicate
that the absence of a face-to-face meeting between the child witness and
the defendant does not appear to increase the possibility of the child
making a mistake in identification.' 89
In addition, other research has shown that children, when they are
apprehensive, may not tell all they know about an event.' 90 One reason
for this, according to researchers, could be because the children have
been told to keep quiet about the event.191 Also, children testifying in a
courtroom setting are more likely to claim they do not know information
when they do and somewhat more likely to be less accurate in the infor-
mation they recall than children testifying in a small private room with-
An Empirical View, 85 MICH. L. REV. 809 (1987). The hypothesis for the study
was that if "children were questioned in a small setting by only one unfamiliar
person, they could recount a greater amount of accurate information that they
had witnessed on a videotape than if they were questioned in a typical court-
room setting." Id. at 814. One half of the children in the study testified in a
small room with one-way mirrors. Id. The other children testified in a court-
room setting. Id. The results indicated that the children in the small room per-
formed better than those in the courtroom setting. The authors concluded that
their study did support the original hypothesis-"current courtroom procedures
militate against eliciting complete testimony from children." Id. at 816. For a
more detailed discussion of this study, see infra note 192 and accompanying text.
188. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n at 19-20, Craig (No. 89-478)
(citing Dent, Stress as a Factor Influencing Person Recognition in Identfication Parades,
30 BULL. OF BRIT. PSYCHOLOGICAL Soc'y 339 (1977); Peters, The Effects of Event-
Stress and Stress During Lineup Identification on Eyewitness Accuracy in Children, in D.
Peters, Chair, Children s Eyewitness Testimony (paper presented to American Psychol-
ogy-Law Society Meeting, Miami, Fla. (1988))).
189. Id.
190. See Bottoms, Goodman, Schwartz-Kenny, Sachsenmaier & Thomas,
Keeping Secret: Implications for Children's Testimony (1990) (paper presented at
American Psychology-Law Society Meeting, Williamsburg, Va. (March, 1990))
(on file with Villanova Law Review). This study examined the testimony of chil-
dren regarding events they had been instructed to keep secret. Id. at 2. In the
study, each child and his or her mother were put in a room alone and the mother
played with, broke and hid a toy. Id. at 5. One group of children were told by
their mothers to keep these facts secret. Id. The children in the control group
were not given that instruction. Id. The study revealed that older children (six-
year-olds as opposed to four-year-olds) generally "kept" the secret when ques-
tioned, not by actively lying, but rather by omitting information. Id. at 9. Addi-
tionally, it did not make a difference if the interview for the six year-olds was
leading or non-leading-the children were equally likely to keep the secret. Id.
Most interesting perhaps, only one child out of 49 (both age groups) freely re-
vealed without questioning that his or her mother broke and hid the toy, regard-
less of whether or not that child was given the secret instruction. Id. The
authors suggest that this could be because the mother hid the toy and the chil-
dren themselves inferred that this should be kept secret. Id. at 7.
191. Id. at 10. The authors suggest that, where a child delays in disclosing a
crime or in omitting information about an event, the "child may be responding
quite understandably to pressure from a trusted person to keep the event a se-
cret." Id.
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out the defendant present.1 92 From these studies it appears that, not
only is the child victim's televised testimony not likely to be less reliable
than the child's in-court testimony, but also that the televised testimony
is likely to be more trustworthy due to the absence of confrontation with
the defendant and use of a non-courtroom setting for the child's
testimony.
b. Is the jury's perception of the demeanor of the child witness
altered by observing the child on television rather than in
person?
There is some question as to whether a jury's perception of a wit-
ness could be affected by viewing that witness on television, as opposed
to live in the courtroom. 19 3 The provisional answer, at least at this time,
seems to be that there is not a significant difference in terms of jury
perception in viewing live or televised testimony. Not only is there re-
search suggesting that jurors cannot detect deception in witnesses with
any high degree of proficiency, 19 4 but other evidence to date also indi-
192. Note, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical View, supra note 187,
at 813-17. In this study, the children watched, on videotape, a mock father-
daughter confrontation. Id. at 814. The researchers then tested the ability of
these children to recall this event. Id. Half of the children testified in a small
room; the other half testified in a courtroom setting. Id. The study tested both
free recall, looking for "central items, irrelevant details, and inaccuracies," and
responses to specific questions. Id The study showed that "compared to chil-
dren in a courtroom, children in a small room tend to (1) relate more central
items in free recall; (2) answer specific questions correctly more often; and
(3) say 'I don't know' or give no answer when asked specific questions signifi-
cantly less often." Id. at 815 (footnotes omitted).
193. One study done in 1977 for the FederalJudicial Center looked at the
impact of televised testimony in the courts. G. COLEMAN, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO
USE ON COURT FUNCTION: A SUMMARY OF CURRENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
(1977) (Federal Judicial Center publication No. FRC-R-77-9). The study recog-
nized that the disadvantages of closed circuit television for the presentation of
testimony could include "the effect that removal from the courtroom might have
on witness veracity, the effect of psychological distance created by the physical
separation of jurors and witness, and the possible distorting effects of the me-
dium on the information communicated." Id. at 19. The study also reported a
suggestion that "when testimony is presented via videotape, the witness domi-
nates the screen, and therefore, his testimony and demeanor assume relatively
greater importance in relation to the appearance or theatrics of the attorney."
Id. (citing McCrystal et al, First Videotape Trial: Experiment in Ohio, 26 DEFENSE L.J.
276 (1972)). In 1977, there were no studies "available to indicate whether the
presentation of testimony via CCTV has the same impact on trial participants
and outcome as does testimony represented by an individual who appears per-
sonally in the courtroom." Id. Fourteen years later, there is still very little re-
search available on this subject.
194. See G. MILLER & N. FoNTEs, VIDEOTAPE ON TRIAL-A VIEW FROM THE
JURY Box (1979).
[T]he two studies indicate that accuracy in detecting deception was not
significantly affected by the mode of presenting testimony; in fact, we
stressed that high levels of nonverbal information may actually hamper
attempts to assess witness veracity. By far the most interesting result
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cates that there is either (1) not a significant difference in viewing testi-
mony on television versus viewing it in person,' 9 5 or (2) a lack of
conclusive data showing the impact of television viewing of witnesses on
a jury. 19 6 It is also submitted that closed circuit television testimony
may even aid, rather than hurt, a defendant, as an in-court appearance
by a child victim may have a greater emotional impact on the jury than a
televised image. The courts should, however, be aware of any possible
impact of televised testimony on a jury, especially in areas where the
court can control the setting and minimize any artificial impact on the
jury's perception of the witness' demeanor (e.g. the lighting and place-
ment of the witness). 19 7
was the relatively low level of accuracy across all presentation modes, a
finding which suggests that jurors are probably not notably effective in
determining whether a witness is testifying truthfully.
Id. at 205.
195. In doing research on the effects of videotape evidence on juror per-
ceptions, Gerald Miller and Norman Fontes found that "the findings from the
studies discussed fail to indicate that the use of videotaped trial materials pro-
duces any deleterious effects on the juror response." Id. at 217; see also Ryan &
Cassan, Television Evidence in Court, 122 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 655 (1965) (emotions,judgement, attention, memory capacity and conduct can be directly observed by
the jury on television as well as in person).
There are state decisions in accord. In People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d
398, 405, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 417 (1974), the videotape of a witness' preliminary
hearing was introduced at trial. The court rejected the defendant's confronta-
tion clause challenge, stating: "Conceding that testimony through a television
set differs from live testimony, the process does not significantly affect the flow
of information to the jury. Videotape is sufficiently similar to live testimony to
permit the jury to properly perform its function." Id. at 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. at
420; see also State v. Sheppard, 197 NJ. Super. 411, 432, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343
(1984) (use of videotaped testimony of 10 year old victim in child abuse trial
satisfied confrontation clause requirements since defendant, judge and jury
could see victim and there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination).
196. Miller, The Effects of Videotape Testimony injury Trials: Studies on juror Deci-
sion Making, Information Retention and Emotional Arousal, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 331,
343. While some empirical evidence suggests that televised testimony does not
have a negative effect on the ability ofjurors to determine the credibility of wit-
nesses, the researchers express concern about the validity of the experimental
procedures and would like more research done before implementation becomes
widespread. Id. The internal logic of this experimental study and the problems
it presented were discussed in Bermant, Critique-Data in Search of Theory in Search
of Policy: Behavioral Responses to Videotape in the Courtroom, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 467,
471.
197. Lighting, for example, can affect a viewer's perceptions. "[W]e might
falsify the appearance of a subject, according to how we light it. We can exag-
gerate or suppress its characteristics, imply the presence of features that do not
exist. We can confuse the observer so that he cannot interpret accurately what
he thinks he sees before him." G. MILLERSON, THE TECHNIQOUE OF LIGHTING FOR
TELEVISION AND MOTION PICTURES 64 (1st ed. 1972).
Several courts have noted that there may be significant differences between
testimony by closed-circuit television and testimony face-to-face with the jury
because of distortions and exclusions of evidence. See, e.g., Hochheiser v. Supe-
rior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1984). For
example, the camera lens angle chosen can make a witness look small and weak,
1606
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c. Is there a risk of the jury giving undue weight to the procedure
employed in deciding guilt or innocence?
There are also some questions as to what, if any, undue weight jury
members could place on the fact that the child witness has been placed
in a different room to testify.' 9 8 Does the use of a closed circuit televi-
sion brand a defendant with a mark of guilt in the minds of a jury? Jus-
tice Blackmun, in his Coy v. Iowa dissent, summarily dismissed this idea,
rejecting the defendant's claim that the screening device placed between
the defendant and the child witness was inherently prejudicial because it
suggested to the jury that the defendant was guilty.' 99 Justice Blackmun
stated that a screen, unlike prison garb, was not the "sort of trapping
or large and strong, and lighting can alter demeanor. Id. at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr.
at 278-79. Off-camera evidence is necessarily excluded while the focus is on a
different part of the body. Id. It is also possible that the credibility of a witness
whose testimony is presented via closed circuit television may be enhanced by a
phenomenon known as "status-conferral." Id. at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279. It is
recognized that the media bestows prestige and enhances authority of an indi-
vidual by legitimizing his status. Id.
Regardless of these differences, videotape testimony has been held to be
constitutionally adequate for demeanor purposes by courts in at least three
other states. The New Jersey Superior Court, for example, has allowed the use
of videotape depositions as evidence in criminal trials:
[I]t is apparent to this court from the demonstration of the equipment
to be used in this matter and the expert testimony that the use of a
videotaped presentation has the capacity to present clear, accurate, and
evidentially appropriate transmissions of images and sounds to defend-
ant, the judge, the jury, and the public.
State v. Sheppard, 197 NJ. Super. 411,431,484 A.2d 1330, 1342 (NJ. Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1984). Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated:
Confrontation does not require live presentation of evidence to the
trier of fact. A photographic or electronic presentation is not perfect as
a substitute for live testimony, but it will suffice. Video tape cannot be
any less helpful in enabling a jury to assess credibility than a bare tran-
script read by the prosecutor.
Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Ky. 1986); see also People v. Mo-
ran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420 (1974) (although tele-
vised testimony differs from live testimony, process does not significantly affect
flow of information to jury; video tape is sufficiently similar to live testimony to
permit jury to properly perform its functions).
198. This question was raised in Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). The Hochheiser court acknowledged that
closed circuit television testimony "may affect the presumption of innocence by
creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors towards the defendant similar to
that created by the use of physical restraints on a defendant in the jury's pres-
ence." Id. at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
511 (1976) (although state cannot compel accused to stand trial in prison garb,
failure to make objection at trial negates possibility of unconstitutional compul-
sion or prejudice); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544-45 (1965) (televising crimi-
nal trial in which there was widespread public interest inherently unfair as
infringement of defendant's fundamental right to fair trial because of potential
impact notoriety of televised proceedings would have on jurors).
199. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1034-35 (1988) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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that is generally associated with those who have been convicted."200
Concededly, the court should, however, take care to instruct the jury
that no significance should be attached to the use of the closed circuit
television procedure. 20 1
Based on current information, therefore, televising the child wit-
ness' testimony should not make a significant difference in the reliability
of that testimony. Two of the traditional "indicia of reliability"-under
oath and cross-examination-are not affected by the medium used. In
addition, televised testimony seems to afford the jury a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the witness' statements. Under the Roberts
test, even if child witnesses are held to be "unavailable," the televised
testimony does indeed have sufficient, and perhaps even greater, indicia
of reliability to fall under a confrontation clause exception.
E. Coy and "Eyeball-to-Eyeball" Confrontation
Coy v. Iowa 2° 2 seemed to halt a long progression of cases in which
the Court had evaluated the purposes of the right to confrontation and
found them to be essentially to promote the accuracy and reliability of
evidence at trial. Coy instead relied on a literal interpretation of the
word "confront," but pointed to no clear or recent precedent in estab-
lishing this interpretation. 203 The Coy majority did note, however, that
200. Id. at 1035 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
201. See id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, em-
phasized that the trial court had instructed the jury to draw no inference from
the presence of the screen separating the witness from the defendant. Id. at
1034-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
203. Justice Scalia in Coy cited the Latin roots of the word "confront,"
Shakespeare, the Bible and President Eisenhower for support in discussing the
importance of face-to-face confrontation. Id. at 10 15-18. According to Justice
Scalia:
There are indications that a right of confrontation existed under Ro-
man law. The Roman Governor Festus, discussing the proper treat-
ment of his prisoner, Paul, stated: "It is not the manner of the Romans
to deliver any man up to die before the accused has met his accusers
face to face, and has been given a chance to defend himself against the
charges."
Id. at 1015-16 (quoting Acts 25:16).
"[C]onfront" ultimately derives from the prefix "con-" (from
"contra" meaning "against" or "opposed") and the noun "frons"
(forehead). Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of con-
frontation when he had Richard the Second say: "Then call them to
our presence-face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will
hear the accuser and the accused freely speak ...."
Id. at 1016 (quoting W. SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 1, sc. 1).
What was true of old is no less true in modern times. President Eisen-
hower once described face-to-face confrontation as part of the code of
his home town of Abilene, Kansas. In Abilene, he said, it was necessary
to "[m]eet anyone face to face with whom you disagree. You could not
sneak up on him from behind, or do any damage to him, without suffer-
ing the penalty of an outraged citizenry.... In this country, if someone
1608 [Vol. 36: p. 1569
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attempting to protect child witnesses at trial through this type of court-
room procedure presented a confrontation problem different from any
addressed by past cases. 20 4 The Court also acknowledged, albeit with
no further explanation, that there could be exceptions to the literal right
to confront.205
A major flaw in the Iowa procedure, according to the Coy Court, was
the legislative presumption of trauma to the child. 206 Significantly
though, the Coy majority left open the possibility, a possibility whichJus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence openly embraced, that the combination of
an individualized finding of trauma to the child witness and a compelling
state interest in the protection of child victims could together qualify as
grounds for such an exception to the confrontation clause.207 It is sub-
mitted that Craig is merely that possibility made reality.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in past years struggled with the protections
that should be afforded under the confrontation clause. In this struggle,
the Court has examined the particular situation, the changing times and
circumstances and the purposes to be served by the right to confront.
Upon this examination, the Court has sometimes allowed a refinement
or change in courtroom procedures so that our adversary system of
criminal justice can take full advantage of the benefits of the times, cir-
cumstances and situation. Throughout this struggle, the Supreme
Court has never held that the Constitution demands an absolute right to
face-to-face confrontation as the only means to protect the accused's
right to confront the witnesses against him.
The Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,208 had viewed the
right to confrontation as a common law right with recognized, but non-
static, exceptions; the exceptions could change or even enlarge as long
dislikes you, or accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide
behind the shadow."
Id. at 1017-18 (quoting press release of remarks given by President Eisenhower
to B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League, Nov. 23, 1953).
204. Id. at 1020. The Court noted that while the "implicit rights" con-
ferred in the confrontation clause-the right to cross-examine, the right to ex-
clude out-of-court statements, the right to face-to-face confrontation in the
proceedings other than at trial-may give way to other important interests, the
right addressed in Coy was the "right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the
Clause .... ." Id.
205. Id. at 1020-21. "Our cases suggest, however, that even as to excep-
tions from the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to
its most literal application, something more than the type of generalized finding
underlying such a statute is needed when the exception is not 'firmly... rooted
in ourjurisprudence.'" Id. at 1021 (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 183 (1987)).
206. Id. at 1020-21.
207. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
208. 291 U.S. 97 (1933).
1991] NOTE 1609
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as there was no material departure from the rationale of the general
rule. 20 9 In decisions prior to Coy and Craig, the Court had dealt with
situations in which a witness whose statement was used at trial was physi-
cally unavailable to testify in court. In Coy and Craig, the child witness
was physically available to testify and did testify, but either was not in
the same room as the defendant, or was shielded from the sight of the
defendant in the courtroom. 2 10 This is a change which does enlarge the
confrontation right exceptions, yet does not strain the rationale of the
rule.
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 2 11
the Constitution is a "living charter"; it is not a "stagnant, archaic, hide-
bound document," but is rather a fluid instrument that recognizes that
times change.2 1 2 The Supreme Court has demonstrated its adherence
to this precept in the confrontation clause cases which have explored the
protection afforded criminal defendants. While procedures are allowed
to change, the rights that the clause ensures for a defendant cannot be
diminished.2 1 3
The Craig decision is a valid extension of already-existing excep-
tions to the face-to-face confrontation requirement for witnesses at a
criminal trial. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Craig, recognized that the
Maryland procedure serves a valid interest and that the accused is given
virtually everything guaranteed by the confrontation clause, except face-
to-face confrontation. 2 14 The extension to the face-to-face confronta-
tion exceptions permitted in Craig allows state legislatures to protect in-
dividual child abuse victims testifying at trial from further trauma where
necessary, while still ensuring that the fundamental rights of criminal
defendants are protected in the full manner intended by the Framers of
our Constitution.
Karen L. Tomlinson
209. Id. at 107.
210. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15; Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3158-59.
211. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
212. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. The rights ensured by the confrontation clause are the right to have
the witness testify under oath, the right to cross-examine the witness and the
right to have the jury observe the demeanor of the witness.
214. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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